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Although criminal justice scholars continue to debate the
overall value of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, broad consensus
prevails that requiring crimes to be defined in specific terms reduces
law enforcement discretion. A few scholars have questioned this
assumption, but the conventional view remains dominant. This Article
intends to resolve the question whether the void-for-vagueness doctrine
really reduces police discretion. It focuses on traffic enforcement, a
context in which laws are both specific and subject to discretionary
enforcement. The Article concludes that specific rules do not constrain
discretion unless judicial limits are placed either on the scope of
activities that may be criminalized or on police authority to under-
enforce the laws. The Article also argues that the Supreme Court's
response to specific-rule discretion is inadequate. The Court reassures
us that the Equal Protection Clause protects against discriminatory
traffic enforcement. However, the Court fails to appreciate that
antidiscrimination review is inherently ineffective when applied to
broadly discretionary decisions. Legislatures have thus circumvented
existing doctrinal constraints on delegating discretion, but the Court
has failed to develop an adequate doctrinal response. Finally, the
Article considers some remedial and constitutional implications of its
analysis. Ultimately, the Article argues, judicial checks on specific-rule
enforcement are required to maintain a balance between individual
liberty and crime control in a constitutional regime committed to the
rule of law.
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In Kolender v. Lawson, the Supreme Court invalidated, as
excessively vague, a vagrancy ordinance requiring suspicious persons
to provide "credible and reliable" identification to a requesting police
officer.1 Edward Lawson had been stopped fifteen times in less than
two years pursuant to the ordinance, prosecuted twice, and convicted
once. 2 He had no other criminal record. 3 Not mentioned in the Court's
opinion is that Edward Lawson is "a black man of unconventional
appearance."'4 According to news reports at the time, Lawson is tall
and slender, with tightly coiled, shoulder-length hair.5 Known as the
"1-5 Stroller,"6 Lawson liked to go on long evening strolls through
upscale, predominantly white neighborhoods in San Diego.7 Lawson is
a civil rights activist and an occasional actor.8 He perceives his
encounters with police officers ("police") as "part of being black in this
country."
In striking down the ordinance, the Supreme Court expressed
concern that the broad discretion the law vested in police by its vague
language created an intolerable risk that police would enforce it in an
arbitrary or discriminatory manner. 10 Because the ordinance "failed to
describe with sufficient particularity" how to satisfy a police request for
identification,1" the Court explained, "an individual.., is entitled to
continue to walk the public streets 'only at the whim of any police
officer' who happens to stop that individual. .".."12 Acknowledging
legitimate needs of law enforcement to investigate suspicious persons,
the Court reassured that "this is not a case where further precision in
the statutory language is either impossible or impractical."
' 13
Presumably, lawmakers in California and several other states with
similar vagrancy laws could redefine identification in more specific
1. 461 U.S. 352, 353-54 (1983).
2. Id. at 354.
3. Id. at 354 n.2.
4. Aaron Epstein, Court Rejects Loitering Law; Cops Can't Require Man's ID, MIAMI
HERALD, May 3, 1983, at 11A.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Tim Weiner, Court Victory for the Individual but Law Guarding Citizen Rights Is Still
Vague, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 8, 1983, at C01.
8. Patricia Ward Biederman, Charges Against Activist Dropped, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1993,
at J4.
9. Epstein, supra note 4.
10. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1983).
11. Id. at 361.
12. Id. at 358 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)).
13. Id. at 361.
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terms, such as a "driver's license" or other statutorily enumerated
evidence of identity.
14
Ten years later, Edward Lawson found himself in the news
again, after being stopped and arrested by police.1 5 As before, he was
stopped while traveling through an upper-class neighborhood and, as
before, he was arrested for failing to provide identification to police.
1 6
This time, however, he was stopped while driving, and he was
arrested for the specific offense of failing to provide a driver's license.
1 7
On March 29, 1993, Beverly Hills police received a phone call from a
woman who reported a black man driving at a slow speed past an
elementary school.18 Police stopped and questioned Lawson. After
Lawson failed to produce his license, police arrested him and
transported him to jail, where he spent two nights until
arraignment.1 9 According to news reports, Lawson said that "after
being patted down by police officers, he raised his hands above his
head, asked for a lawyer and declined to answer questions about his
identity."20 Lawson insisted that he was "never asked to show
identification, only if he had it."21 "He eventually told officers his
driver's license was in his car, where one of the policemen retrieved
it."22 As to why Lawson had been driving slowly near a school, he
explained that he was required to by law. 23 "It's another Catch-22,"
Lawson complained, "[a] black man drives fast past a school ... it's
against the law. A black man drives slow past a school ... that's
against the law. I don't know what they expect us to do."
24
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world in which the police have absolute discretion to
stop you for any reason or no reason, to interrogate you, search you,
arrest you if suspicious activity is discovered while interrogating or
searching you, and, if no such activity is discovered, to decide whether
14. See State v. Boudette, 791 P. 2d 1063, 1065-66 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding part of a
statute requiring licensed drivers to display a driver's license upon request by an officer).




19. Michael White, Challenger of Old ID Law Jailed, DAILY NEWS (L.A.), Apr. 1, 1993, at
N3.
20. Man Whose Suit Ended ID Law Is Arrested Again, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM
(Cal.), Apr. 1, 1993, at A15.
21. Biederman, supra note 8.
22. Man Whose Suit Ended ID Law Is Arrested Again, supra note 20.
23. Biederman, supra note 8.
24. Man Whose Suit Ended ID Law Is Arrested Again, supra note 20.
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to let you go on your way or arrest you for simply being out in public.
Imagine a world, that is, with a peremptory search and seizure.
Presumably, most Americans would recoil at such a police state, and
jurists would cite the inconsistency of unfettered police discretion with
the rule of law. As understood in American jurisprudence, the rule of
law requires that government officials exercise coercive power over
people only when authorized by laws previously enacted by politically
legitimate institutions. As Professor Jerry Mashaw explains:
A consistent strain of our constitutional politics asserts that legitimacy flows from "the
rule of law." By that is meant a system of objective and accessible commands, law which
can be seen to flow from collective agreement rather than from the exercise of discretion
or preference by those persons who happen to be in positions of authority. By reducing
discretion, and thereby the possibility for the exercise of the individual preferences of
officials, specific rules reinforce the rule of law.
2 5
As Mashaw's statement reflects, central to the rule of law is the
principle that specificity in legal rules serves to constrain the
discretion exercised by those charged with their enforcement. This
principle has been constitutionalized by the courts, through the void-
for-vagueness doctrine, as a safeguard against legislative delegation of
excessive discretion to courts and to executive officials and agencies,
especially the police.
26
The void-for-vagueness doctrine has received substantial
attention in the legal literature.27 Much of the debate has concerned
25. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 138-39 (1997).
26. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 215-16 (1985) (noting that courts' invalidation of overbroad
delegations of authority can constrain police and prosecutorial abuse, particularly in the realm of
"street-cleaning" statutes).
27. For sources favoring the void-for-vagueness doctrine, along with other restraints on
police discretion, see Anthony G. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the
Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police
Offices, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 221 (1967) [hereinafter Amsterdam, Crimes of
Status], which asserts that "a vague statute fundamentally affronts the rule of law embodied in
the Due Process Clause by permitting and encouraging more or less arbitrary and erratic arrests
and convictions"; David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response
to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1062-63 (1999), which argues that
scholars overestimate the courts' cabining of police discretion, and advocates more strict control;
Jeffries, supra note 26, at 197, which notes that vagueness doctrine, while often contextual, does
"bar wholesale legislative abdication of lawmaking authority"; Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth
Amendment Doctrine Learn from Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398, 404 (2001),
which advocates use of the Supreme Court's void-for-vagueness reasoning in 4th Amendment
search and seizure cases; Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social
Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 835-36 (1999),
which argues that vague loitering laws "reinforcen stereotypes that portray Blacks as lawless
and legitimate police harassment in Black communities," thereby undermining "constitutional
safeguards against race-based police abuse." For sources skeptical of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, see Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1243-46 (1996), which
defends discretionary use of vagrancy and disorderly conduct laws by police to maintain public
1500
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the extent to which constraining police discretion through legislative
specificity is desirable, and whether courts are better than political
institutions at determining how much police discretion should be
allowed. Defenders of the void-for-vagueness doctrine contend that
limiting police discretion by defining criminal laws in specific terms
minimizes the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement,
especially against the poor, racial minorities, and other politically
marginalized groups. 28 In contrast, skeptics of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine contend that it has been used to limit police discretion too
much, to the detriment of communities threatened by crime and that
political institutions offer a more promising means for guiding police
discretion than do the courts. 29
Largely unquestioned by courts and scholars in this debate is
whether specific rules do, in fact, reduce discretion; that is, whether
the void-for-vagueness doctrine really limits the amount of discretion
that legislatures can delegate to executive officials. Defenders of the
doctrine tend to accept the conventional view that specific rules
constrain discretion, emphasizing instead why constraining discretion
is desirable. 30 Skeptics, who would weaken or eliminate the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, also assume that specific rules limit discretion,
order; Alfred Hill, Vagueness and Police Discretion: The Supreme Court in a Bog, 51 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1289, 1289 (1999), which argues that vagueness doctrine is an unworkable response to
abuse of authority and a threat to community policing; Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares,
Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1184 (1998), which
favors greater discretion for police; Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 593-94 (1997)
[hereinafter Livingston, Police Discretion], which questions whether vague laws necessarily
accord excessive discretion to police; William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 559-61 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics], which
argues that vagueness review does not cabin police discretion, as it fails to combat specific, albeit
broad statutes. The classic treatment of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67
(1960) [hereinafter Amsterdam, Vagueness Doctrine].
28. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Crimes of Status, supra note 27, at 220-24 (1967) (discussing how
vague laws invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement); Cole, supra note 27, at 1084
(stating that "vague laws invite selectivity and make discriminatory enforcement far more
difficult to monitor"); Jeffries, supra note 26 (arguing that delegation of discretion invites abuse,
including discriminatory enforcement).
29. See, e.g., Kahan & Meares, supra note 27, at 1171-76 (arguing that because minorities'
political power over their own communities has increased, traditional vagueness doctrine harms
community initiatives, and advocating application of "political process" theory as an alternative);
Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 27, at 608-18 (criticizing the rules-standards divide in
vagueness review and recognizing that even specific laws can be subject to discriminatory
selective enforcement).
30. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Crimes of Status, supra note 27, at 222-24 (denouncing the
"dictatorial power over the streets" that vague laws give to police); Cole, supra note 27, at 1084
(arguing that "vague laws are more susceptible to selective enforcement and more impervious to
community oversight than specific laws"); Jeffries, supra note 26, at 215 (stating that "wholesale
delegation of discretion naturally invites its abuse").
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but believe that courts are ill-equipped to determine how much
discretion is too much.31 Thus, while there is intense disagreement in
the judiciary and the academy over the value of reducing discretion
and of the courts' role in doing so, broad consensus prevails that
specific rules do reduce discretion.
This consensus is showing cracks, as some scholars have begun
to question the efficacy of legislative specificity in constraining
discretion. 32 Professor Debra Livingston has provided the most
substantial articulation of this perspective to date.33 In defending
political approaches to constraining police discretion, Livingston
contends that specific laws can confer just as much discretion as vague
laws. 34 Indeed, she argues that judicial invalidation of laws on
vagueness grounds is not only ineffective at constraining police
discretion, but it is also counterproductive because it encourages
legislatures to enact overly broad, yet specific laws, such as curfews,
that give police even greater discretion in enforcing public order on the
streets.35 Professor William Stuntz has made similar points in the
context of prosecutorial discretion, arguing that the void-for-
vagueness doctrine merely prompts legislatures to pass overlapping,
specific crimes that give prosecutors broader discretion to charge
multiple offenses against a defendant in order to leverage a guilty
plea.3 6 In contrast, while acknowledging that specific laws can confer
broad discretion, Professor David Cole insists that vague laws confer
31. See Kahan & Meares, supra note 27, at 1169-70 (arguing that courts should leave it to
communities to determine how much discretion to give to police).
32. See id. at 1170 (claiming that when courts invalidate "vague" laws, ironically they often
invite greater degrees of police discretion); Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 277, at 667
(claiming that vagueness doctrine, interpreted too broadly, can impair the ability of communities
to deal with serious problems); Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 27 (noting that attacking
vagueness does nothing about the breadth of statutes).
33. See generally Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism about
Police Patrol, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 141 (1999) [hereinafter Livingston, Gang Loitering] (advocating
a focus on police accountability rather than statutory vagueness); Livingston, Police Discretion,
supra note 27 (maintaining that vagueness review is a poor method of containing police
discretion, and it impairs community initiatives).
34. Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 27, at 618 ("[B]road and overinclusive rules
enhance police discretion, and ... a plethora of narrow rules may not meaningfully constrain
it .... "); id. at 593 ("Limiting the discretion that police exercise on the street simply by
demanding specificity in the laws that they enforce is so hopeless, ... [because] '[e]limination of
discretion at one choice point merely causes the discretion that had been exercised there to
migrate elsewhere in the system.' " (quoting Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 97 (1985))).
35. Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 27, at 615 ("[T]he aggressive invalidation of
laws embodying indefinite standards ... could put pressure on localities to adopt 'rule-like'
formulations that substantially broaden police authority.").
36. Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 27.
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more.37 The extent to which specific rules reduce discretion is thus
uncertain and contested.
This Article intends to resolve the debate over whether
requiring specificity in legal rules reduces the discretion that
legislatures can delegate to executive officials. Part I explains the
constitutionalization of legislative specificity as a judicial response to
excessive legislative delegation and analyzes recent doctrinal
developments in the context of investigatory traffic stops that call into
question the efficacy of specificity as a meaningful constraint on the
delegation of discretion. The degree of discretion delegated to law
enforcement through specific laws in the traffic context appears to be
as great as has ever been accomplished through vague laws and,
moreover, borders on making police discretion to stop, search, and
arrest motorists essentially unfettered.38 In effect, a peremptory
search and seizure is permissible under our constitutional regime and,
with respect to motorists, a peremptory traffic stop seems to exist
already.
Part II is the centerpiece of the Article. Section II.A addresses
the question of what constraints, if any, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine places on the capacity of legislatures to delegate discretion to
executive officials. The analysis builds on, and goes considerably
beyond, the important insights of Livingston and Stuntz, providing a
comprehensive and systematic analysis of the relationship between
specific rules and enforcement discretion. The inquiry reveals that the
degree of enforcement discretion can be understood as a function of
both affirmative and negative choices. By "affirmative choice," I mean
the authority of police affirmatively to subject people to enforcement
procedures. By "negative choice," I mean the authority of police to
decline to subject people to enforcement procedures even when police
are legally authorized to enforce the laws against them. Vague laws
tend to vest police with broad discretion, both affirmative and
37. Cole, supra note 27, at 1084.
38. Several scholars have observed that traffic laws confer virtually unlimited discretion on
police to investigate whichever motorist they wish. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and
Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2005-09 (1998) (stating that traffic
stops are often pretextual and based on race); Timothy P. O'Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond
Probable Cause, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69
U. COLO. L. REV. 693, 693-94 (1998) (denouncing pretextual traffic stops and criticizing judicial
approach to the subject); Christopher Slobogin, Let's not Bury Terry: a Call for Rejuvenation of
the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1053, 1067-68 (1998) (characterizing traffic
and loitering laws as "preventive crime" statutes, which are "designed to give police probable
cause for arresting those suspected of being up to no good"); William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson,
Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 853-54 (2001)
[hereinafter Stuntz, O.J. Simpson] (stating that because most everyone violates traffic laws,
police may "stop anyone, anytime, for any reason").
2007] 1503
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negative. As the analysis further demonstrates, however, specifically
defined crimes may delegate as much discretion as vague laws if
designed according to certain factors. Such factors include the
seriousness of the criminalized conduct, the difficulty of avoiding the
conduct, the social norms surrounding violation of the crime, the rate
of law enforcement against such crimes, and the extent to which police
and other executive officials have incentives to enforce against
commission of the crime for ulterior purposes. Moreover, the
affirmative and negative choices created by specific rules are
interdependent. That is, expansion of affirmative enforcement options
also tends to expand the degree of discretion to under-enforce the law,
and increasing negative enforcement authority tends to increase
affirmative enforcement choice. Ultimately, as traffic laws exemplify,
specific rules can be designed to delegate virtually limitless discretion.
My conclusion, however, is not that specificity in legal rules
contributes nothing to constraining the delegation of discretion.
Specific rules make the question of whether enforcement is authorized
more predictable and less subject to manipulation. Provided that there
remains some conduct outside the proscription of a specific rule,
enforcement discretion is constrained by the specific rule with respect
to that conduct. The discretion-constraining effect of specificity thus
depends on whether limits are placed on either the scope of activities
that may be criminalized by specific rules or on the authority of
executive officials to under-enforce the rules. To the extent that
legislatures are permitted to criminalize a broad range of conduct
through specific rules and police are permitted to ignore violations of
such rules, the requirement of legislative specificity places very little
constraint on the delegation of discretion. Without limits on what
conduct legislatures may criminalize or on what crimes police may
ignore, the requirement of legislative specificity constrains only the
form by which legislatures can delegate discretion to executive
officials, not the degree of discretion they can delegate.
Section II.B moves beyond the debate over the effect of specific
rules on discretion. Based on the analysis in Section II.A, it accepts
that specific rules may confer broad discretion and considers the effect
that such discretion has on the ability of courts to determine, through
antidiscrimination review, whether such discretion is exercised in a
discriminatory manner: The analysis reveals an inverse relationship
between the degree of discretion created by specific rules and the
capacity of courts to monitor the enforcement of such discretion for
discriminatory motives, such as race, sex, or religion. The greater the
discretion conferred by specific rules, the more difficult it is for courts
to determine whether the discretion was enforced in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner. As the degree of discretion tends toward
1504 [Vol. 60:5:1497
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absolute, the effectiveness of antidiscrimination review tends toward
zero. The Supreme Court failed to appreciate this insight when, in
response to claims of excessive police discretion created by traffic laws,
the Court reassured us that the Equal Protection Clause provided a
safeguard against discriminatory enforcement.3 9 The Court's response
is inadequate to the extent that antidiscrimination review is
inherently ineffective when applied to decisions that are broadly
discretionary. Indeed, the void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised on
an understanding that broad discretion makes discrimination largely
undetectable. 40 The Court thus seems to have misunderstood the
extent to which discretion can be delegated through specific rules and
the implications of such discretion for antidiscrimination review. The
result is that legislatures effectively have circumvented existing
constitutional constraints on delegating discretion, but the Supreme
Court has failed to develop an effective doctrinal response.
Part III is suggestive only. It considers some implications of the
relationship explored in Part II between specific rules and
enforcement discretion and between enforcement discretion and
antidiscrimination review. Section III.A considers implications for
developing effective constraints against legislative delegation of
excessive discretion through specific rules in the context of traffic
regulation. Potential approaches include limiting the authority of
police to exploit traffic laws for pretextual purposes, requiring the
police to justify enforcement practices that have a discriminatory
impact, requiring higher enforcement rates, and precluding
enforcement of minor traffic violations. While any of these approaches
alone or in combination should limit enforcement discretion, the most
promising may be the requirement that police only enforce against
serious traffic violations. Limiting enforcement to serious violations,
such as unreasonably hazardous or reckless driving, would increase
police incentives to consistently enforce the law and thereby
strengthen the relationship between the law on the books and the
enforcement thereof.
Section III.B considers some constitutional implications of
these suggestions, primarily concerns over judicial usurpation of
legislative and executive prerogative. My emphasis on judicial
remedies is not because courts are better able than legislatures to
limit legislative delegation of discretion. They are not. The inquiry of
this Article, however, concerns whether the void-for-vagueness
doctrine limits legislatures that decline to limit themselves. I argue
39. See discussion of Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), infra notes 98-107 and
accompanying text.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 144-46.
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that additional judicial initiatives to limit the delegation of discretion
through specific rules should not violate separation-of-powers
principles. Legislative supremacy in the criminal law requires judicial
checks on delegating discretion, checks among which the void-for-
vagueness doctrine serves an important though insufficient role.
I. THE UNCERTAIN VALUE OF LEGISLATIVE SPECIFICITY
A. Constitutionalizing Legislative Specificity to Safeguard the
Rule of Law
This Section describes key values of the rule of law and the
principal constitutional doctrines designed to implement them,
including the judicial development of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
It does not attempt to define the "rule of law" in a universal sense, but
rather to identify significant features of the concept as understood in
American jurisprudence. Although many readers will be familiar with
basic rule-of-law principles, a brief primer is warranted to inform my
subsequent assessment of how effectively legislative specificity
safeguards the rule of law. In addition, understanding the rule of law's
centrality to our constitutional regime is relevant to assessing the
legitimacy of judicial mechanisms, suggested in the final Section, 41 for
constraining legislative delegation through specific rules.
Reflected in the phrase, "a government of laws, and not of
men,"42 a central focus of the rule of law is constraining the discretion
of government officials.43  It requires that officials exercise
governmental power pursuant to previously defined instructions that
flow from collective agreement by the body politic or by representative
governmental institutions, rather than pursuant to the idiosyncratic
predilections or the whims of the officials. 44 The appropriate sources of
such collective instruction include constitutions and legislation. Such
rules, moreover, should be sufficiently clear to guide government
officials in the exercise of their discretion. The rule of law means, as
41. See infra Section III.B.
42. RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 2 (2001).
43. Indeed, constraining government officials is arguably the most important function of the
rule of law. See id. at xii ("[The framers of the Constitution] saw constraining discretionary
power of government officers-the central focus of the rule of law-as essential to the society
they hoped to create.").
44. See MASHAW, supra note 25, at 139 (observing that the rule of law requires legal
commands to "flow from collective agreement rather than from the exercise of discretion or
preference by those persons who happen to be in positions of authority").
1506 [Vol. 60:5:1497
20071 RULING OUT THE RULE OF LAW 1507
Justice Antonin Scalia explains, a "law of rules," 45 so that when
government acts, there should be "a clear, previously enunciated rule
that one can point to in explanation of the decision."46 A corollary
principle is that government decisions should be, to a meaningful
degree, predictable.47 For the administration of legal rules to be
predictable, not only should individual rules be sufficiently clear, but
it also should be possible to anticipate what rule shall apply when
there is a conflict or overlap of applicable rules.48 Legal rules also
should be accessible to the public in order to provide fair warning of
what conduct may subject one to government intervention. 49 As
Friedrich Hayek succinctly explains, the ideal of the rule of law
"means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and
announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with
fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given
circumstances, and to plan one's affairs on the basis of this
knowledge."50 It is thus inconsistent with the rule of law for executive
officials to exert coercive power over individual citizens unless such
action is previously authorized and fairly predictable by reference to
politically legitimate collective instructions. 51
45. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187 (1989).
46. Id. at 1178.
47. See CASS, supra note 42, at 7-12 (describing the qualities of "principled predictability");
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 35-36 (1977) (noting that while discretionary
standards may incline a judgment one way or the other, rules dictate results); FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-
MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 137-45 (1991) (discussing the "argument from reliance" and the case
for certainty and predictability in decision-making); Oliver Wendall Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (discussing the law from the perspective of the "bad man,"
who cares only about what consequences the law will visit on his behavior); Scalia, supra note
45, at 1179 ("Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it, 'reckonability,' is a needful characteristic of
any law worthy of the name." (quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 17
(William S. Hein & Co. 1996) (1960))).
48. As Ronald Cass explains:
It is not enough that Rule A gives a clear indication what legal rights and duties
attach in particular circumstances if Rule B also applies in those circumstances but
with different results. A legal system's rules can meet the test for principled
predictability in such settings only when there is a Rule C that provides guidance for
resolving conflicts among other rules-and that gives a reasonably clear directive
which rule (A or B) has priority.
CASS, supra note 42, at 8.
49. See id. (noting that accessible laws allow citizens the chance to anticipate and moderate
the law's impact); MASHAW, supra note 25 (discussing the "objective and accessible" nature of the
commonly asserted "rule of law").
50. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 75-76 (2d ed., Routledge 2006) (1944),
quoted with approval in Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtues, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW
210, 210 (1979).
51. George Fletcher identifies two different conceptions of the rule of law: a modest version
that refers to the requirement that government be bound by collectively-enacted rules by
legitimate institutions, and a stronger, less widely-accepted, version that requires that the law
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Legislative supremacy in defining the criminal law is a widely
accepted tenet of American jurisprudence, although it was not always
as well accepted as it is today. Legislative supremacy derived in part
from the emerging significance of the principle of legality, which
forbids retroactive crime definition. As Professors Bonnie, Coughlin,
Jeffries, and Low explain:
The essential idea is that no one should be punished for a crime that has not been so
defined in advance by the appropriate authority. Generally speaking, the appropriate
institution for crime definition is the legislature. For most purposes, therefore, the
principle of legality may be taken to signify the desirability in principle of advance
legislative specification of criminal conduct.
5 2
The rise of legislative supremacy also stemmed from
Enlightenment theory's emphasis on the centrality of representative
institutions to the legitimacy of government authority. Now "widely
recognized as a cornerstone of the penal law," the insistence that
crimes be defined in advance by legislatures did not emerge in Europe
until the late eighteenth century. 53 Its reception in America was
complicated. In its favor, advanced legislative definition of crime fit
with early American notions of popular sovereignty and separation of
powers. 54 In addition, more contemporary justifications stress the
contribution of advanced legislative crime definition to guiding the
discretion of police and prosecutors by ensuring that they initiate
coercive action against individuals only when authorized by previously
legislated rules.55 In tension with legislative supremacy, however, was
America's reception of English common law, which included the
practice of judicial crime creation in response to innovative acts of
misconduct.56 Though decreasing as legislative supremacy gained
wider acceptance, occasions of judicial crime creation in the United
States can be found into the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries.57
be -just or moral. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 11-13 (1996). As
Fletcher observes, the quotidian work of the legal system conforms to the first version, while the
second is reserved for the interpretation of certain constitutional provisions, particularly the Due
Process Clause. Id. at 13. See also CASS, supra note 42, at 15 (noting that the stronger version is
less widely accepted). This article is principally concerned with the modest version, rule of law by
collective instruction, but to the extent that the collective instructions embodied in the
Constitution also serve justice, the modest version tends to serve the interests of the stronger
version as well.
52. RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 85 (2d ed. 2004).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 86-87.
55. See id. at 89-91 ("[The principle of legality operates primarily to control the discretion
of the police and of prosecutors." (quoting HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 88-91 (1968))).
56. Id. at 87-88.
57. See id. at 88 (noting a 1954 decision affirming a misdemeanor conviction for making
obscene phone calls, despite no statutory authorization).
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Today, however, American jurists widely agree that the rule of law
forbids judicial crime creation.
58
The rule of law is implemented through several constitutional
provisions. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits criminal punishment
for conduct occurring before legislative enactment of the law
prohibiting such conduct,5 9 and the Due Process Clause, as courts
have come to interpret it, similarly forbids courts from retroactively
defining crimes.60 The provision most directly concerned with police
discretion is the Fourth Amendment.6 1 It requires the police to have
objective evidence that a suspect has violated or will violate the
criminal law before subjecting the suspect to arrest, search, or
custodial interrogation.
62
In addition to procedural constraints on legislatures and law
enforcement officers, the Constitution limits the content of and
motivation behind legislative instructions. The Due Process Clause,
for example, forbids the criminalization of a person's status, as
distinct from his conduct. 63 Furthermore, the First Amendment 64 and
Equal Protection Clause 65 impose antidiscrimination constraints on
the criminal law, forbidding the selective criminalization of conduct
based on a group's political or religious affiliation,6 6 race, or national
origin,67 or based on otherwise arbitrary or capricious factors. 68 The
police likewise are prohibited directly by these constitutional
58. Id.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1798) (describing the scope
of ex post facto laws).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1964)
(stating that unforeseeable retroactive application of criminal statutes violates the Due Process
Clause).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. TV; see Maclin, supra note 27, at 418 (arguing that controlling police
discretion is the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
62. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) (stating that searches "ordinarily must
be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing'); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222
(1960) ("[W]hat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures.").
63. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring that no State "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law").
66. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990) (declaring unconstitutional a
statute that criminalizes flag-burning); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972)
(declaring unconstitutional a statute that burdens certain Amish religious practices).
67. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (granting writ of habeas corpus to
Chinese nationals victimized by discriminatory enforcement of local ordinances).
68. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) ("Judicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that
a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.").
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constraints from selectively enforcing the law in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner. 69 Combined, these constitutional constraints
limit police enforcement to persons about whom the police have
objectively justified suspicion of conduct in violation of a law
previously defined by the legislature and further limit the extent to
which such enforcement may be invoked selectively for illegitimate
reasons. In theory, court enforcement of these doctrines should
restrain police discretion within tolerable bounds.
These constitutional constraints, however, proved inadequate
to prevent legislatures from delegating excessive discretion to
executive officers by defining laws in vague terms. Vague laws, though
formally enacted in advance, effectively left it to police to decide what
conduct was criminal through the ad hoc interpretation of an
amorphous standard to circumstances as they arose. 70 Fair notice to
the public also was undermined because vague laws provided
insufficient warning as to what conduct would trigger investigation
and prosecution. 71 The Fourth Amendment provided little protection,
because a wide range of conduct appears reasonably to violate vague
laws that can be interpreted broadly. 72 And the antidiscrimination
rules of the Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment ("the
Equal Protection Clause," collectively 73) were rendered largely
ineffective because identifying whether a decision was motivated by
an arbitrary or impermissible reason is difficult, as a practical matter,
when applied to a decision otherwise vested with broad discretion.
Vague laws, in effect, gave police the authority to stop, interrogate,
search, and arrest whomever they chose for any reason.
In response to legislative circumvention of the rule of law
through vaguely defined crimes, the courts developed, under the Due
69. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (stating that the Equal
Protection Clause provides the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of the laws).
70. See Jeffries, supra note 26, at 196-97 (noting the potential for police and prosecutorial
abuse of unduly vague laws).
71. See id. at 205-12 (discussing the requirements of notice and fairness).
72. See Amsterdam, Crimes of Status, supra note 27, at 226-28 (describing how vagrancy
statutes and other vague laws can circumvent the requirement of probable cause for detention
and search).
73. For convenience, I will generally refer only to the Equal Protection Clause and often
only to racial discrimination in discussing constitutional constraints on discriminatory law
enforcement. The Equal Protection Clause is the principal antidiscrimination provision in the
Constitution, forbidding discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin or sex, or
on the basis of arbitrary or irrational reasons. The First Amendment, although different in many
respects, also presumptively prohibits discrimination on certain bases, such as religion or
political affiliation. For purposes of this article's inquiry into the effectiveness of
antidiscrimination constraints on the exercise of broad discretion, the First Amendment and
Equal Protection Clause provide essentially the same constraint, or lack thereof.
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Process Clause, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which requires
specificity in the definition of crimes. 74 Specificity, the Supreme Court
explained, serves to provide fair warning to the public regarding what
conduct may trigger government intrusion.75 Legislative specificity
also serves to constrain the discretion delegated to executive officials,
especially the police. 76 By requiring the police to act only on objective
evidence that a specific rule of conduct has been violated, legislative
specificity minimizes the risk that police will single out people for
arbitrary or discriminatory reasons. 77 The Court thus incorporated
specificity into the constitutional constraints on legislatures to ensure
that advanced legislative crime definition guides the discretion of law
enforcement officials.
The American constitutional regime today thus requires that
law enforcement officials can search or arrest a person only if the
officer has justified suspicion to believe the suspect has violated a
specific rule of conduct defined in advance by the legislature.
Antidiscrimination analysis also should be supported by legislative
specificity because identifying potentially illegitimate motivations is
facilitated by enabling a comparison across cases when the factors
that may legitimately distinguish cases are identified and defined
with particularity. 78 Accordingly, by incorporating a requirement of
legislative specificity through the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the
Court ensured a certain degree of restraint on the discretion that
legislatures could delegate to law enforcement.
79
B. Persistent Concerns Over Police Discretion and the Court's
Antidiscrimination Response
This Section notes the apparent persistence of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement of traffic laws despite their compliance
with the requirement of legislative specificity and further notes the
74. See Jeffries, supra note 26, at 2 12-19 (discussing vagueness doctrine's role in supporting
the rule of law).
75. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162-63 (1972) (voiding a vagrancy
statute for vagueness based on lack of notice and the possibility of arbitrary enforcement).
76. See id. at 168-70 (citing unfettered discretion in the hands of Jacksonville police as
another reason the vague law did not pass constitutional muster).
77. See PACKER, supra note 55 (discussing the importance of limiting the discretion of police
and official prosecutors).
78. David Cole has made a similar observation: "Where the police selectively enforce a
specific law, identification of similarly situated violators is relatively straightforward. But where
the police selectively enforce a law whose very contours are imprecise, one cannot know whether
the police are engaged in selective enforcement unless one knows how the contours are defined."
Cole, supra note 27, at 1084.
79. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (recognizing that vagueness
doctrine requires legislatures to adopt minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement).
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Supreme Court's proposed remedy, the Equal Protection Clause, and
its apparent inadequacy as a safeguard against discriminatory
enforcement. The discussion emphasizes concerns over racial profiling.
This is not meant to suggest that racial discrimination is the only
concern implicated by police discretion. However, racial discrimination
in law enforcement is a primary concern that underlies the
development of the requirement of legislative specificity, and it is a
concern about which there is substantial anecdotal and statistical
evidence.80 Racial profiling in enforcing traffic laws thus serves as a
useful window into the risks posed by the discretionary enforcement of
specific rules.
Despite the panoply of constitutional constraints on legislative
delegation, widespread concern persists over the abuse of police
discretion in the context of traffic enforcement.8' The most widely
cited and well-documented concern is the targeting of motorists based
on race or ethnicity,8 2 including more recently the investigation of
people presumed to be Arab or Middle Eastern.83 Whether race or
ethnicity should be permitted as evidence of suspiciousness is a matter
of dispute, but the extent to which police appear to engage in such
discrimination without judicial scrutiny of a practice that is at least
presumptively unconstitutional is difficult to reconcile with the rule of
law. Police abuse of discretion, moreover, goes beyond race.
Discriminatory police tactics against the poor, the young, and other
politically marginalized or "out" groups continue to be time-honored
practices.8 4 And motorists of all backgrounds have experienced traffic
stops that seem as likely motivated by the out-of-state license plate,
the make or model of the vehicle, the physical appearance of the
80. See Karlan, supra note 38, at 2006 ("[T]here is substantial evidence that many
departments use statistical profiles in which race is a factor."); Roberts, supra note 27, at 808
('There is overwhelming evidence that police officers stop motorists on the basis of race for minor
traffic violations.").
81. See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT
WORK (2002) (attacking racial profiling through traffic stops as both morally reprehensible and
ineffective); Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug
Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 659-60 (2002) (concluding that studied
traffic stops were both racially imbalanced and affected by profiling); Wayne R. Lafave, The
"Routine Traffic Stop" from Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine," Not Enough Fourth
Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1845 (2004) (noting that stops are often made on "arbitrary
considerations such as the driver's skin").
82. HARRIS, supra note 81, at 129-44 (discussing traffic profiling across a number of races);
Gross & Barnes, supra note 81, at 660 (finding racial profiling at work in traffic stops).
83. See Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1413, 1413-14 (2002) (describing a new emphasis on profiling based on Arab descent).
84. See Chet K.W. Pager, Lies, Damned Lies, Statistics and Racial Profiling, 13 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'y 515, 524 (2004) ("[Plolice profiling by gender and age is even stronger than profiling
by race.").
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driver, or the fortuity of filling an officer's revenue quota.8 5 Although
such intrusions usually involve mere inconvenience, a substantial
amount of largely anecdotal evidence suggests a troubling number of
traffic stops involve significant time, intrusiveness, physical restraint,
and emotional abuse.
8 6
The void-for-vagueness doctrine, concerned primarily with
guarding against the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory law
enforcement, is ineffective at preventing racial profiling and other
forms of illegitimate traffic enforcement because the traffic laws on
which officers rely are generally quite specific. Driving in excess of the
speed limit, failing to signal within a specific distance of turning, or
failing to stop completely at a stop sign are as precise as any rule of
law and more precise than most. The Fourth Amendment is also
impotent in constraining police discretion created by traffic laws. It
requires that police have reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation
before they can stop and investigate a motorist and have probable
cause before conducting a search or arrest.8 7 However, as several
scholars have observed, traffic laws are violated frequently by most
people.88 As a result, suspicion of a traffic violation by those the police
wish to question is usually easy to substantiate.8 9
The procedures authorized by the Fourth Amendment,
moreover, are not limited to the temporary detention of a driver. In
85. See Illya Lichtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A Government of Men?,
50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 425, 442-44 (2003) (analyzing the effects of quotas on frequency of traffic
stops).
86. See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 438-40
(1997) (recounting the experience of a Harvard Law School graduate who, while returning from a
funeral, was forced with his family to stand in the rain while a narcotics dog sniffed their car and
found no drugs); Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment
Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 336-38 (2002)
(recounting the arrest of a mother for not wearing a seatbelt while her children cried in the car);
Erika L. Johnson, 'A Menace to Society:" The Use of Criminal Profile and Its Effects on Black
Males, 38 HoW. L.J. 629, 658 (1995) (recounting the experience of Olympic gold Medalist Al
Joyner who was "ordered to his knees" by police as a suspect for a crime, then detained again
minutes later by the police for a different crime, even though his car did not match the make or
model involved in the second crime).
87. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300-02 (1999) (stating that it is reasonable to
search a car when probable cause exists); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) ("As
a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.").
88. See, e.g., Surell Brady, A Failure of Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Claims in
Criminal Cases, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 735, 778 (2002) (stating that in a Maryland traffic study,
"92% of all drivers were observed exceeding the speed limit by at least one mile per hour");
Livingston, Gang Loitering, supra note 33, at 173 ("almost everyone violates traffic rules
sometimes").
89. See Andrew D. Leipold, Targeted Loitering Laws, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 474, 499 (2001)
("Given the high number of traffic laws, . . . it would be a particularly dense police officer who
could not find some reason to briefly detain a person ... ").
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states where the legislature has defined traffic violations as
criminal, 90 an officer with probable cause to believe a traffic violation
has occurred may arrest the driver, interrogate him, and search him
and his car. 91 If evidence of another crime is discovered from the
interrogation or search, the officer may seize evidence of the
additional crime and charge the driver accordingly. 92 If no evidence of
other crime is discovered, the officer may decide whether to let the
driver go uncharged or charge him by citation; alternatively, he may
handcuff him, take him to the station, jail him for up to forty eight
hours or longer, impound the car, and perform a comprehensive
inventory search thereof. 93  Because virtually everyone, acting
conscientiously and reasonably, violates traffic laws every time they
drive, 94 an officer can identify a crime to justify a stop, search,
interrogation, and arrest of virtually any motorist he chooses.
95
A concern raised by such discretion is that the police may
selectively enforce traffic laws against particular motorists as a
pretext for investigating crimes for which they lack justified suspicion
or as an excuse to target particular motorists for arbitrary or
discriminatory reasons.96 Indeed, a substantial body of anecdotal and
statistical evidence suggests that such practices are common and
90. Most states define some traffic violations as criminal. See Robert Henry, In Memorium:
Bernard Schwartz, 33 TULSA L.J. 1048, 1053 (1998) (observing that traffic offenses are "still
treated as criminal offenses in most states").
91. A motorist may be arrested and searched for ordinary speeding in several states,
including Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, Utah, and Wisconsin. See Memorandum from Ben
Doherty, University of Virginia Law Librarian, on Search Incident to Arrest for "Ordinary"
Speeding (June 30, 2006) (on file with author) (surveying state laws regarding authorization for
custodial arrest and search incident to speeding). See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C.
MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, VOLUME I: INVESTIGATION 197-240, 251-60
(4th ed. 2006) (summarizing Fourth Amendment doctrines concerning arrest, search incident to
arrest, including of automobiles, and inventory searches, including of automobiles).
92. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (sustaining a post-arrest search
and seizure of illegal drugs, when the suspect was initially arrested for driving without a valid
license).
93. See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 91.
94. See Brady, supra note 88 (showing the frequency with which traffic laws are violated in
a Maryland study).
95. See Leipold, supra note 89, at 499-500 (suggesting that an officer can target any
motorist at will); Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, supra note 38, at 843 ('The law governing traffic stops
allows police to pull over anyone for any reason."); id. at 853 ("Traffic rules are defined to include
thoroughly ordinary behavior like driving a few miles per hour over the speed limit.
Consequently, the large majority of drivers violate them.").
96. See Leipold, supra note 89 ("[I]t would be a particularly dense police officer who could
not find some reason to briefly detain a person she had previously selected even if the reason for
the stop is in fact race-based."); Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, supra note 38, at 843-44 ("Because
limitless discretion leads naturally to discrimination, it hardly seems surprising that complaints
about racial profiling have focused on traffic stops.").
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widespread.97 In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court
considered whether the risk that police may enforce traffic laws for
illegitimate reasons warranted judicial scrutiny above and beyond
whether a traffic violation reasonably appeared to have occurred.
98
The defendant was stopped for a minor traffic violation, during which
the police discovered illegal drugs.99 The circumstances suggested that
the police's motivation in enforcing the traffic stop was a desire to
investigate possible drug activities for which they lacked reasonable
suspicion and suggested further that they may have relied on the fact
that the defendant was black. 100 Not only was the traffic violation too
trivial to raise the concern of most officers, but the police in this case
were plainclothes vice-squad agents who, under Department
regulations, were prohibited from enforcing minor traffic violations. 10 1
The defendant argued that the broad discretion created by the
comprehensiveness of traffic regulations demanded that the Court
limit enforcement to violations that a reasonable officer would
enforce. 10 2 Such a rule would serve to minimize the extent to which
police could use traffic violations as pretexts for investigating
unsubstantiated crimes or for targeting motorists based on improper
factors, such as race.
The Court held that objective evidence that a traffic violation
occurred is all that is required for a stop to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of the actual motivation for the stop and
regardless of whether a reasonable or typical officer would have
responded to the traffic violation. 10 3 With respect to the risk of racial
discrimination, the Court responded: "We of course agree with
petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the
law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis
for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the
Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment."10 4
My research has disclosed only two cases in which a defendant
has demonstrated successfully that race played a role in his traffic
stop, despite the large number of cases in which claims of
discrimination have been made and the growing body of empirical
97. See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black"
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265-67 (1999) (describing anecdotal and statistical evidence in
support of racial profiling).
98. 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996).
99. Id. at 808-09.
100. Id. at 808, 810.
101. Id. at 808, 815.
102. Id. at 810.
103. Id. at 819.
104. Id. at 813.
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evidence that such practices are common. With respect to these cases,
moreover, one involved extreme facts, 10 5 and the other was in New
York, which at the time barred pretextual stops under state law and
therefore permitted inquiry into police motives when circumstances
suggested pretext, an inquiry that led to discovery of the racial
motive. 106 Under Whren, which New York has since adopted under
state law, an allegation of pretext is no longer a basis to inquire into
police motive, absent specific evidence of a discriminatory purpose.
10 7
If the police are engaging in racial profiling, but it is rarely proven,
two questions arise: why does the requirement of legislative specificity
seem so ineffective at constraining police discretion, and why does the
Equal Protection Clause seem so inadequate at checking abuses of
such discretion?
II. THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG SPECIFICITY, DISCRETION, AND
ANTIDISCRIMINATION
A. Vagueness, Specificity, and Discretion
In order to understand whether and to what extent specific
laws can be used to delegate as much discretion as vague laws, this
Section first considers how vague laws create discretion; it then
considers the extent to which specific laws can achieve a similar effect.
105. The defendant alleged that the officer, a member of a drug task force, targeted him for a
traffic stop because of his race. The officer admitted that he had engaged in racial profiling in the
past, but said he had discontinued the practice after being advised it was illegal. Despite the
officer's admission of past racial profiling and a continued pattern of overwhelmingly targeting
black and Hispanic motorists, he denied using race in this case because, he explained, he is
physically color-blind. The court found that he was lying. United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp.
332 (D. Colo. 1990).
106. See People v. Young, 660 N.Y.S.2d 165, 168 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (citing New York case
law barring pretextual traffic stops). In Young, an officer pulled over a car driven by three black
males for improperly changing lanes. An extensive search of the driver, passengers and car
discovered cocaine on one of the passengers. The appellate court ruled based on facts adduced at
a suppression hearing, that the evidence should have been suppressed because the stop was
really a pretext to investigate the passengers for other criminal activity. The facts raising the
inference of pretext included that the officer did not normally enforce traffic laws and did not
even carry the forms necessary to issue a traffic ticket. Rather, he was an investigative detective
who at the time was wearing a business suit, driving an unmarked car, and on his way to
investigate a burglary. He also followed the defendant's car for several miles before initiating a
traffic stop. Finally, although the officer also claimed he had reason to believe the car was stolen,
he said to an another officer called to the scene that he was determined to continue his
investigation into whether the car was stolen even after a file check uncovered no discrepancies
in the defendants' answers to his initial questions and after finding that the car's license plate
number was not listed as stolen. The court ultimately concluded that the stop was both
pretextual and based in part on the race of the vehicle occupants. Id. at 165-168.
107. 517 U.S. 806, 819.
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Vague laws create discretion by expanding enforcement choice in two
respects-affirmatively and negatively. By "affirmative choice," I
mean the authority of police to subject observed people to enforcement
procedures. By "negative choice," I mean the authority of police to
decline to subject observed people to enforcement procedures even
when enforcement against them is authorized. Vague laws facilitate
police discretion both in deciding whom to arrest and in deciding
whom to ignore.
Vague laws expand affirmative choice in a number of ways.
First, a vague law can be manipulated by police to apply to a wide
range of conduct and therefore to a wide range of people engaged in
such conduct.108 Second, a vague law expands the pool of potential
suspects by limiting notice to the public as to what conduct violates
the law. Although lack of fair notice is often cited as its own
justification for prohibiting vague laws, 10 9 lack of notice also affects
affirmative enforcement opportunities. To the extent that the public is
unable to understand the nature of the conduct proscribed by a vague
law, the public is more likely to violate the law unwittingly, thereby
expanding the pool of potential suspects.
Vague laws facilitate negative choice by enabling police to
ignore potential suspects. The open-endedness of a vague law enables
police who are not concerned with a potential suspect's conduct to
interpret the law as inapplicable to the conduct. The conclusion may
be one of good faith, i.e., the police sincerely believe the law should not
be implicated and construe the law consistent with their subjective
reaction. A vague law also enables police to ignore those suspects they
believe are in violation of the law, because the vagueness in the law
enables police plausibly to deny that it applies to the observed
conduct.110
The question is whether requiring specificity in the definition
of crimes reduces the discretion that can be delegated to police as
compared to the degree of discretion afforded by vague laws. Initially,
it would seem obvious that specific laws constrain discretion more
than vague laws. If discretion is expanded, both affirmatively and
negatively, by the uncertainty and manipulability of a vague law, then
108. Amsterdam, Crimes of Status, supra note 27, at 219 (explaining that vague laws often
act as a "catch-all").
109. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) ("Living under a
rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that '[all persons] are entitled to be
informed as to what the State commands or forbids.'" (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S.
451, 453 (1939))); Amsterdam, Crimes of Status, supra note 27, at 217-20 (discussing the lack-of-
notice objection to vague statutes).
110. See Amsterdam, Crimes of Status, supra note 27, at 222 (stating that a vague law could
become a "de facto licensing scheme").
2007] 1517
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
precise, clear laws should limit the extent to which police can
affirmatively choose whom to arrest (only those in violation of a
specific rule of conduct) and whom not to arrest (those whose conduct
does not violate any specific rule). Specific laws also should give more
effective notice than vague laws to the public regarding exactly what
conduct to avoid if police intrusion is undesired, thereby minimizing
the number of unwitting violators from whom police can select
enforcement targets.
The proposition that legislative specificity constrains the
delegation of discretion also informs the law outside the criminal
context. The nondelegation doctrine in separation-of-powers
jurisprudence, for example, requires Congress to provide an
"intelligible principle" when delegating authority to administrative
agencies.111 Vague statutory standards are thought to vest excessive
policy discretion in executive agencies in violation of the constitutional
allocation of "[aill legislative Powers" to Congress. 112 Accordingly,
Congress must define agency authority through guidelines of
sufficient specificity and detail to ensure that important policy
questions are decided by Congress and that agencies and courts
reviewing their actions can discern congressional will sufficiently.
11 3
Although the Court has not enforced the nondelegation doctrine with
meaningful rigor since the New Deal,1 14 it nonetheless assumes that
legislative specificity constrains the delegation of discretion, even
though it has declined to require sufficient specificity to limit
Congress's penchant for delegation.
Support for the discretion-constraining effect of specific laws
also can be found in the literature on standards versus rules.
11 5
ill. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress
shall lay down ... an intelligible principle... such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power."); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 378-79 (1989)
(finding the Sentencing Reform Act constitutional, as it provided an "intelligible principle").
112. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added).
113. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (stating that an absence of
acceptable standards exists when "it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed").
114. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article 1, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2103-06 (2004) (explaining how the Nondelegation
Doctrine has been "uniformly rejected" since Franklin Roosevelt's presidency).
115. See, e.g., CASS, supra note 42, at 5 ("When distinguished from standards, rules are
commonly described as not requiring a similar degree of judgment in their application.");
DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 22-28 (contrasting rules, which are "applicable in an all-or-nothing
fashion," with the principles and policies of standards); Colin Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 66-71 (1983) (describing the implications of and tradeoffs
inherent in transparent rules).
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Standards or, more precisely, rules that embody standards,11 6 provide
only general guidance and call for further interpretation in
application. Specific rules, in contrast, dictate unique outcomes
whenever particular conditions arise, making the resolution clear once
the facts have been determined. 11 7 For example, a standard may forbid
unreasonably fast driving, whereas a rule may forbid driving in excess
of a specified speed limit.118 The former regulation calls for a greater
degree of interpretive judgment in application to facts and, as such, is
more susceptible to the exercise of discretion in its application. 119 The
vaguer the standard, the greater the degree of judgment and the
correspondingly greater degree of discretion that may be exercised.
120
Vague standards are less clear than specific rules and therefore
provide less guidance and predictability with respect to what conduct
violates the law or justifies enforcement. 121 In economic terms, specific
rules provide more guidance ex ante and are more susceptible to
monitoring than vague standards; in so doing, they serve to reduce
prediction costs' 22 and agency costs' 23 associated with enforcing the
rules.
The foregoing virtues of legislative specificity are certainly
plausible. However, they are premised on an assumption that may not
hold true with respect to certain kinds of executive authority,
including that exercised by the police. The assumption is that
executive decisions enforcing specific rules are meaningfully
obligatory, affirmatively or negatively. Specific rules constrain
negative discretion only if those charged with their enforcement are
obligated to enforce the rules against known violators. Specific rules
constrain affirmative discretion only if enforcement officers are
negatively obligated to ignore non-violators-and if ignoring non-
violators appreciably limits the pool of people from whom police can
116. See Diver, supra note 115 (discussing the process of formulating rules that conform to
the drafter's intended standards).
117. See DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 24 (noting the "all-or-nothing" nature of rules).
118. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 586 (7th ed. 2007).




122. Prediction costs are generally regarded as the costs involved in predicting the legal
consequences of a given action. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562-63 (1992) (noting that ex ante promulgations (rules) are more
costly to create than ex post promulgations, which shift costs to those who must interpret the
law).
123. Agency costs are the costs involved in keeping an agent on task and executing the
intentions of the principal. POSNER, supra note 118, at 420. See id. at 587 (noting that broad
standards increase agency costs).
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select enforcement targets. If, however, legislatures defined, through
specific rules, a wide range of common conduct as criminal, and if law
enforcement were largely free to ignore violations, then police would
have broad choice to enforce or not to enforce against a large portion of
the population.
Traffic laws illustrate this phenomenon. They are generally
quite specific and are defined as crimes in several states. 124 Speed
limits alone cast a wide net for the police. The majority of motorists
violate such laws, and law enforcement, often admittedly, ignores
most drivers who exceed the limit by less than five miles per hour. 12
5
Under-enforcement is not, moreover, merely a result of limited
resources. For instance, a certain degree of non-compliance is probably
desired to avoid the traffic burdens that would result from full
compliance with posted speed limits. 126 Indeed, the safest driving
speeds on most highways exceed posted limits. 27 However, because
driving sixty-seven miles per hour in a zone posted at sixty-five
violates the law, police can rely on the violation of a specific rule to
justify stopping almost any motorist on the road. When the totality of
124. See Memorandum from Ben Doherty, supra note 91 (discussing the
criminal/noncriminal nature of speeding among the states and whether custodial arrest is
available).
125. See Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1405 n.39
(2002) (citing police officers' statements on non-enforcement for drivers exceeding the speed limit
by 7 to 10-15 mph).
126. See POSNER, supra note 118, at 587 (explaining the economic benefits of creating
overinclusive speed limit laws).
127. Most traffic safety engineers agree that the safest speed limits should be set between
the 80th and 90th percentile speed of free flowing traffic under good conditions, rounded to the
nearest 5 mph interval. This is usually referred to as the "85th percentile rule" or 85th percentile
speed. Thus set, about 85% of the traffic would be defined as traveling at legal speeds and only
about 15% would be in violation. Most posted limits in the United States, however, are set
between the 50th and 10th percentile speeds, thereby defining 50% to 90% of all drivers as
driving illegally. Citations to research about the 85th percentile methodology and other speed
limit research can be found at National Motorists Association, Speed Limits, Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.motorists.org/speedlimits. A point of great controversy with the National
Motorists Association and others who support scientifically set speed limits for safety is the fact
that the safest speed of travel with the lowest possible risk of having an accident is also around
the 70th to 90th percentile speed range. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. Thus, when
the speed limit is set at the 30th percentile speed, a common range for highway limits, it is
illegal for anyone to travel at the speed which gives them the lowest risk of having an accident.
The upshot is that, on most highways, the majority of motorists are prudent to violate the speed
limit, which in turn leaves them subject to be stopped at the discretion of the police. The
information in this footnote was provided to me by James Walker, a recognized expert in speed
limits and traffic safety. See e-mail from James Walker, President, JCW Consulting, to author
(Apr. 25, 2007) (on file with author). See also Susan L. Oppat, Speed Limits Slated to Go Up, ANN
ARBOR NEWS, June 2, 2007, at Al (identifying James Walker as speed limit expert and
discussing safety and arbitrary enforcement concerns with speed limits set below the 85th
percentile); James Walker, Safety, Not Ticket Revenue Should Be Goal of Speed Limits, ANN
ARBOR NEWS, July 12, 2007, at A14 (same, and identifying Walker as traffic safety expert).
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traffic and vehicle regulations are considered, the great majority of
motorists are in violation of the law within a relatively short period of
driving, affording the police the discretion to pick virtually any car
and follow it until a violation of the law is observed.
A related factor that affects the degree of discretion that can be
delegated through specific rules is the seriousness of the conduct
proscribed. The less serious the conduct covered by a specifically
defined offense, the larger the pool of violators will be, thereby
increasing affirmative enforcement opportunities. Laws directed to
minor or innocuous conduct enlarge the pool of violators because such
conduct is likely to be consistent with reasonable, law-abiding
behavior, and the public therefore will believe it is socially and
morally acceptable. The public is also less likely to believe such
conduct violates the criminal law, and thus the incentive to avoid such
conduct is decreased. Consider traffic regulations. Although those
rules necessary to ensure safety are generally known, the myriad
driving and vehicle rules covers conduct too harmless to intuit as
violative of social norms or the criminal law.
Even when the content of the law is known by the public, the
incentive to comply will be minimal when the expected burden from
violation is low. With traffic laws, for example, people often assume
that their violation can result only in an inconvenient, temporary stop
and a fine, not a custodial arrest and criminal prosecution. Notice the
controversy surrounding the arrest of a mother in front of her children
for seatbelt violations, which the Supreme Court upheld in Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista.128 Similarly, the lack of stigma associated with
violating rules that proscribe common and innocuous conduct
minimizes the incentive to avoid such conduct. Despite the status of
traffic laws in many states as criminal, 129 the stigma associated with
their violation is trivial. People routinely acknowledge, with as much
indignation as embarrassment, having been stopped by the police for
speeding,130 and employment applications often inquire about prior
criminal charges "other than traffic violations." 131 Indeed, because
128. 532 U.S. 317, 323 (2001). See, e.g., Op-Ed., A Supreme Wrong; Trashing the Fourth
Amendment, S.D. UNION-TRIBUNE, May 8, 2001, at B8 (criticizing the decision); Molly Ivins,
Editorial, Hey, All of You Petty Criminals, Now You're Going Straight to Jail, CHI. TRIBUNE, May
10, 2001, at N31 (same).
129. See Memorandum from Ben Doherty, supra note 91 (noting the criminal or quasi-
criminal nature of speeding in the states of Arizona, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin).
130. See Raymond, supra note 125, at 1406-09 (discussing public outrage over "speed traps").
131. See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 26 (1996) [hereinafter Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line] ("Job applications often ask
for criminal histories but distinguish between traffic 'crimes' and other crimes, suggesting that
the criminal label carries no sting for most traffic offenses.").
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variance in speed among cars on the road contributes to the risk of
accident, it is safer, not just more convenient, to exceed the speed limit
to match the flow of traffic. 132 Because of the minimal burden and
stigma, as well as potential benefits, associated with traffic violations,
the rate of violation will tend to be high and increase the number of
violators subject to enforcement.
Negative enforcement discretion, i.e., the freedom to ignore
motorists, including those observed violating the law, is also
unconstrained by specific criminal laws because of the legal and
practical authority police have to ignore violators. By "legal authority,"
I mean the extent to which police are not required legally to make
arrests that they are authorized legally to make. Constitutionally,
police are prohibited from making unjustified arrests and may be held
liable when such arrests violate clearly established law. 133 However,
police generally have no constitutional obligation to arrest anyone.
134
It is true that some states have passed statutes containing general
"full enforcement" obligations 135 or specific enforcement obligations
with respect to certain crimes, such as domestic violence. 13 6 Sanctions
for failing such obligations, however, rarely are invoked against
individual officers. More importantly, full-enforcement obligations are
non-constitutional and therefore do not restrain legislatures that
desire to delegate broad enforcement discretion, as illustrated by the
trend to replace full-enforcement statutes with ones containing more
permissive language. 37
132. See Raymond, supra note 125, at 1427 nn.137-39 (stating that "speed variance" is the
prime cause of accidents).
133. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) ("The contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right."); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("[Officials] generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.").
134. Any duty to arrest is statutorily dictated, not constitutionally required. See, e.g., Town
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 755-56 (2005) (stating that a duty to arrest or protect
could not arise from the Due Process Clause, but must come from state law); Recznik v. City of
Lorain, 393 U.S. 166, 174 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (describing statutory duty to arrest under
Ohio law).
135. See Gregory Howard Williams, Police Rulemaking Revisited: Some New Thoughts on an
Old Problem, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 133-43 (1984) (surveying and discussing "full
enforcement" statutes).
136. See Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the
Politics of the Battered Women's Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 281, 286-96 (1997)
(discussing and analyzing mandatory arrest in the domestic violence context); Developments in
the Law, Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: New State and Federal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1537 n.68 (1993) (surveying state mandatory arrest
requirements for domestic violence and protection order violations).
137. See Gregory Howard Williams, Police Discretion: A Comparative Perspective, 64 IND.
L.J. 873, 894 (1989) (noting a statutory trend toward discretionary enforcement).
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By "practical non-enforcement authority," I mean the extent to
which police can, as a practical matter, ignore a substantial amount of
criminal conduct, even when statutorily obligated to enforce the law.
To the extent specific rules are designed to cover common, innocuous
conduct like minor traffic infractions, there is little risk of
accountability for police who decline to investigate or to arrest
violators. Such crimes are unlikely to have interested victims pressing
for arrest and prosecution, and there is unlikely to be a public outcry
over under-enforcement of traffic laws, at least with respect to minor
violations. Contrast this with serious crimes. Even if courts lack
authority to require police to step up enforcement of robbery and
burglary crimes, the political heat from under-enforcement would
create significant pressure to enforce these laws.
Another factor contributing to negative, non-enforcement
discretion is limited resources. When specific laws are violated in large
numbers and resources are limited, total or even significant
enforcement is impossible. Traffic laws are again illustrative.
Significant enforcement of traffic laws would require the devotion of
far more law enforcement resources than is economically or politically
feasible in most jurisdictions. As a consequence, the police and the
public expect under-enforcement.
It also should be recognized that the exercise of negative and
affirmative discretion are interdependent. Under-enforcement tends to
cause the pool of violators to expand, which, in turn, reduces the
feasible rate of enforcement. The lower the rate of enforcement, the
lower will be the expected cost of violation, causing an increase in the
rate of violation and the scope of affirmative enforcement
opportunities. Under-enforcement also reduces the stigmatic cost
associated with violation, thereby increasing the rate of violation. The
greater the number of violators, the less police can enforce the laws
against a high percentage of violators, thus increasing the pressure to
make negative non-enforcement decisions. Reducing the rate of
enforcement reduces the cost of violation, causing an increase in the
rate of violation, and so on. In exercising their enforcement discretion,
police can, and to some degree must, make choices between
enforcement and non-enforcement based on criteria other than the
fact of violation. While they may rely on legitimate public policy
considerations, such as the seriousness of the violation, overly broad
discretion without legislative guidance invites police officers to resort
to their idiosyncratic values and preferences.
Raising the foregoing concerns over excessive police discretion
does not assume that police generally act in bad faith. Indeed, it
reflects the opposite assumption: that, in general, police only enforce
against suspects they believe they are authorized to investigate.
2007] 1523
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Otherwise, the range of conduct that legislatures define as criminal
would not affect police discretion because police would investigate
whomever they desired, whether or not a law was violated. The
concern, then, is not that police in general are overzealous bigots
without respect for people's rights, but rather that the authority to
enforce against too many people without adequate guidance from the
law on the books inevitably leaves the police to rely on their own
idiosyncratic hunches and sub-conscious stereotypes. With vague laws,
the concern is that police will select among people plausibly violating
the vague law, not that police will harass anyone without any
statutory authorization. While harassment and invidious
discrimination by some police is inevitable, a full appreciation of the
concerns underlying the void-for-vagueness doctrine includes
recognizing that lack of enforcement guidance encourages police
inadvertently to resort to stereotypes in a good faith effort to
investigate people they believe are acting suspiciously. Similarly, with
over-criminalization through specific rules, such as traffic regulations,
the dearth of legislative enforcement guidance leaves many police
officers, acting in good faith, to rely on ad hoc or stereotypical
assumptions in selecting among observed violators.
The discussion thus far does not demonstrate that specificity in
the written law is not desirable or preferable to vagueness. The point
is that formal specificity in the legislative definition of the law does
not assure that the law will be enforced in a consistent and predictable
manner. Predictability depends on many factors other than the
language of legislative rules. To the extent that specific rules are
defined to cover conduct that reasonable people would assume is legal,
or is so underenforced as to provide the same impression, then the
public will not have the capacity to predict the occasions of
enforcement. Moreover, even to the extent that potential targets
understand the content of specific rules, the overwhelming under-
enforcement of such rules leaves unclear when they will be enforced.
When social norms and enforcement patterns are unpredictable, the
criminal law is uncertain, even though its written content is clear.
The foregoing observations suggest that formally specific rules
may be used to delegate as much discretion as vague laws. In some
respects, moreover, specific rules may confer more discretion than
vague laws. First, consider that a standard that is vague on its face
may be more predictable than a specific rule directed at similar
conduct if the specific rule is inconsistent with social norms and
enforcement policy. For example, a police officer probably has a
greater range of choice in selecting against whom to enforce the speed
limit than he does to enforce a law prohibiting unreasonably fast
driving. Although a number of motorists could be stopped based on
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reasonable suspicion of driving unreasonably fast, the great majority
of motorists could be stopped, with complete confidence, for violating
the speed limit.1 38 The inconsistency between the conduct proscribed
by specific speed limits and the reasonable expectations of
enforcement by the public creates a larger pool of violators than does
the vaguer standard against unreasonably fast driving.
Second, consider one concern with vagueness: that police may
select suspects for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons with the
plausible hope that a court will convict the suspect under a statute
sufficiently vague to apply to whatever conduct the suspect engaged
in. While this concern is legitimate, it is ameliorated by the fact that a
court may decline to convict the suspect if the conduct does not merit
punishment in the court's view. Not only may a court disagree with
applying a vague law to a defendant whose conduct was not serious,
but the requirement that courts, unlike police, act openly and give
reasons for their decisions further restrains the extent to which a
court would be willing to endorse an excessively broad interpretation
of a vague law. 139 To be sure, the arrest itself under a vague law would
be difficult for a court to prevent, but at least the risk of arbitrary or
discriminatory convictions is minimized by the court's authority to
construe for itself the contours of a vague law.
With specifically defined crimes, in contrast, a court has less
authority to overrule a police officer's decision to subject a suspect to
criminal proceedings. When evidence supports the violation of a
specific law, a court cannot as easily dismiss the charge simply
because it disagrees that the defendant's conduct justified proceeding
with the charge. Thus, while specific laws that apply to widespread,
innocuous conduct can create as much enforcement discretion as
vague laws, they limit judicial discretion and thereby enhance the
discretionary authority of police, not only as to whether to arrest, but
also whether to ensure a conviction.140
To illustrate, a vague law that prohibits unreasonably fast
driving may be applied to a wide range of conduct within a police
officer's discretion. However, a court looking at the same facts and
having to explain why the prosecution should proceed may decline to
138. See Raymond, supra note 125, at 1397-99 (citing studies that indicate that most drivers
speed to some degree).
139. Although referring to judicial crime creation, rather than judicial construction of vague
laws, Herbert Packer explained that the obligation of courts to act openly and give reasons for
their rulings minimizes the risk that they will act arbitrarily or otherwise abuse their discretion.
See PACKER, supra note 55.
140. William Stuntz makes a similar point about the effect of numerous, slecifically defined
crimes in enhancing prosecutorial discretion over judicial review. See Stuntz, Pathological
Politics, supra note 27, at 561.
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find that the speed was unreasonable even when it accepted the facts
reported by the officer. In contrast, when a motorist is charged with
speeding, a court would be hard-pressed to overrule the officer's
judgment that a specific speed limit was violated. Thus, an officer who
observes a violation of a specific rule is able to make the charge "stick"
more than if the officer enforces a vaguely defined offense. I recognize
that police do not necessarily desire convictions for low-level criminal
conduct, often using such crimes for street-sweeping and order-
maintenance purposes, but to the extent that judicial review of arrests
places any constraint on police behavior, a vague law may provide
greater restraint than a specific law, the violation of which a court
cannot as easily second guess.
A third way in which specific laws can create a higher degree of
discretion than do vague laws is with respect to the penalty range
applicable to a suspect's conduct. In a world where vague laws are
tolerated, legislatures have less incentive to enact several criminal
laws, because a few cover the majority of cases. To ensure a similar
scope of coverage under a regime that requires specific rules,
legislatures have an incentive to enact numerous, targeted rules,
many of which will simultaneously apply to a single course of conduct.
With an array of violated specific rules, an officer has a range of
charges to choose from, enabling him to decide not only whether to
arrest and charge, but also whether to file one or several charges,
creating the potential for a broader penalty range, because multiple
charges could be punished consecutively or could raise the penalty
range under the applicable sentencing system.141 With increased
discretion in the penalty threat, and not just the conviction threat, a
police officer has a greater degree of discretionary power to employ in
a potentially illegitimate manner.142
The foregoing discussion demonstrates, at a minimum, that
specific rules can be used to delegate discretion substantially
comparable to that delegated through vague laws in a world-our
world-in which fairly innocuous conduct may be defined as criminal
and under-enforcement of such crimes is widely tolerated. Indeed, we
have seen that, in some respects, specific laws can confer more
discretionary authority than vague laws. The question arises whether
141. William Stuntz makes a similar point about the effect of specific rules on prosecutorial
discretion to determine a defendant's penalty. See id. at 519-20.
142. It should be acknowledged that, for the great majority of crimes, prosecutors will have
discretion over whether to prosecute all the charges made by a police officer. The leverage
afforded a prosecutor by a police file alleging multiple charges will, however, likely be used by
the prosecutor to induce a plea agreement less favorable to the defendant than if fewer charges
had been made by the arresting officer.
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legislative specificity contributes anything to constraining the
delegation of discretion.
Whether legislative specificity constrains the delegation of
discretion depends on the causal relationship between the content of
law and its enforcement. Only if the content of law affects enforcement
decisions could the specificity of that content have an effect on
enforcement decisions. The content of law, which sets forth the
elements of crimes, determines what conduct is illegal. When an
officer decides whether to enforce the law by investigating and
potentially arresting a suspect, he must make at least two
determinations: whether a suspect is committing a crime and, if so,
whether to enforce the law against the suspect. The first inquiry is a
legal interpretation question that involves applying the elements of a
defined crime to the facts of a suspect's conduct. The second question
involves a largely discretionary determination, weighing the cost of
enforcement against that of non-enforcement in light of a variety of
legitimate considerations, such as the seriousness of the crime and
resource constraints, and more problematic considerations, such as
the race or sex of a suspect, which may nonetheless affect an officer's
calculus as to whether to enforce the law against a particular suspect.
The content of law thus affects enforcement discretion to the
extent that an officer's determination that a suspect has committed a
crime affects his ultimate decision to enforce against the suspect. The
conventional assumption is that the first determination largely
determines the second; that is, whether an officer believes a suspect
has committed a crime usually will cause him to enforce the law
against the suspect. Traditionally, this assumption is reasonable,
especially with respect to malum in se crimes or other crimes
involving dangerous conduct. An officer who witnesses such a crime
usually will intervene. Conversely, although there always will be
exceptions of abuse, most officers will not subject a suspect to
enforcement procedures if the officer believes no law has been
violated. The content of law, in effect, expresses the message that an
officer should enforce the law whenever it has been violated and the
message that he should not enforce the law when it has not been
violated. To the extent law enforcement officers abide by these
legislative commands, the content of law largely predicts its
enforcement. To the extent the content of legislation guides
enforcement, then enforcement decisions will reflect the democratic,
collective agreements that produced the legislation.
Specificity in the content of law thus affects enforcement
discretion by making the determination whether the law has been
violated more clear and, consequently, more consistent and
predictable from one officer to the next. Vague laws, by definition, are
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ambiguous or otherwise unclear in certain applications. Under vague
laws, there will be circumstances where officers are more likely to
differ in their determination of whether the law has been violated-the
violation determination-than they would under more specific laws.
Some officers may believe certain conduct violates the law, indicating
they should enforce it, whereas other officers believe similar conduct
complies with the law indicating they should not intervene. Vagueness
in the law thus produces more inconsistency and unpredictability with
respect to the violation determination. Accordingly, to the extent the
violation determination causes the enforcement decision, specificity in
law contributes to the consistent and predictable enforcement thereof.
As the discussion of traffic enforcement reveals, however, the
connection between the content of law and its enforcement breaks
down when the law is defined in certain ways. Defining crimes to
include, for example, conduct which is harmless or trivial, commonly
engaged in by reasonable, law-abiding people, and grossly under-
enforced, can dampen the causal relationship between an officer's
determination that the law has been violated, which is based on the
content of law and the determination of whether he will enforce it. To
the extent the police, the public, and the legislature are indifferent to
minor traffic violations, such violations merely authorize enforcement
without commanding or even encouraging enforcement based on the
violation alone. Where traditionally a violation of law expressed the
normative message to the police that they should enforce the law,
these traffic violations merely send the message that they may enforce
the law. To the extent officers are indifferent toward enforcing the law
based on its violation alone, they will tend to rely on other factors in
deciding whether to enforce against a particular suspect. If, for
example, an officer suspects a motorist may be carrying contraband
for reasons other than the fact of speeding, the officer has an incentive
to rely on the contraband suspicion in selecting that motorist from
among the pool of speeders, all of whom he is otherwise indifferent
toward. If the officer believes race or some other illegitimate or
arbitrary factor increases the suspiciousness of an observed motorist,
such a factor will contribute to his decision to enforce a traffic
violation that, by itself, would not motivate the officer to intervene.
More broadly, when officers face far too many minor traffic violations
to enforce, are personally indifferent to them, and are unaccountable
for ignoring them, they inevitably will rely on a range of legitimate
and illegitimate factors peculiar to each officer in selectively enforcing
the law. Despite their specificity, traffic laws vest so much discretion
in police that predicting enforcement is exceedingly difficult.
Does it follow that legislative specificity serves no useful role in
reducing discretion? No. It means that specificity in the law guides
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enforcement discretion only to the extent the violation determination
affects enforcement decisions. Admittedly, if specific laws criminalized
all conduct and left police completely free to ignore violators, then the
content of specific laws would provide no more guiding or predictive
value than the vaguest of laws. Police could always investigate or
ignore anyone. If, however, a specific law leaves some room for
compliance, then it will make predictable those occasions when
enforcement is not authorized even if the law criminalizes so much
conduct as to make such occasions rare. In those instances in which
vague laws create uncertainty about the violation determination,
police will vary in determining what conduct justifies enforcement. In
the context of traffic laws, their specificity leaves some, though
admittedly little, room for motorists to comply with the law and for
police to know consistently on those occasions that enforcement is not
authorized and, therefore, should not be exercised.
The benefits of specificity in traffic laws, however, should not
be exaggerated. To the extent specific traffic laws reach a wide range
of conduct, compliance may be very difficult as a practical matter,
even if theoretically possible. For example, a motorist armed with
comprehensive knowledge of the traffic laws may still find it difficult
to adhere constantly to all of them. Furthermore, even if compliance
with specific laws can be achieved with greater confidence than can
compliance with vague laws, the result may be that members of
groups more likely targeted by discriminatory enforcement are
required to comply with the law on the books whereas members of
non-targeted groups can violate the law without significant risk of
enforcement. For example, although black motorists may well
minimize the risk of traffic stops by driving in strict compliance with
the speed limit, the result is that blacks are effectively subject to a
different speed limit than whites. It is hardly a satisfactory cure to the
risk of discriminatory enforcement created by specific-rule discretion
that members of minority groups must abide by standards of conduct
that the majority may safely ignore. Nevertheless, such a state of
affairs is still preferable to a regime in which a vague crime-such as
"prowling by auto"143-leaves minority motorists at a complete loss as
to when, if ever, they can avoid enforcement. Thus, although
specificity is no panacea against discriminatory enforcement, it
contributes some guidance to the determination of when enforcement
is authorized and in so doing contributes some consistency and
predictability to enforcement itself.
143. The landmark case of Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville invalidated a law on
vagueness grounds under which four defendants were charged and convicted for "prowling by
auto." 405 U.S. 156, 157-58 (1972).
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The amount of discretion created by specific rules, then, does
not result from the rules' specificity, but rather from the range of
conduct they proscribe, combined with a lack of effective obligation of
police to enforce them. However, although specificity alone is
insufficient to make enforcement predictable, it does contribute to
predictability, provided other mechanisms serve to limit either the
scope of conduct proscribed or the authority of police to ignore
violations. Such other mechanisms are lacking in the case of traffic
laws. Before suggesting, in Part III, what strategies may help to
constrain the delegation of enforcement discretion through specific
rules, the following Section considers why current doctrines are
inadequate to the task.
B. Discretion and Antidiscrimination Review
Recall that in Whren, the Supreme Court's response to
concerns over the discriminatory exercise of discretion created by
traffic laws was, essentially, "prove it."144 This response is inadequate
because it is inherently impractical to prove a discriminatory intent by
a decisionmaker vested with broad discretion. 145 Indeed, in developing
the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the Court previously recognized that
broad discretion precludes effective detection of discrimination. The
Court invalidated vague laws that delegated broad discretion to the
police on the ground that such laws created an intolerable risk of
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 146  The risk of
discrimination would exist only to the extent that discrimination could
not be detected directly. Otherwise, courts could simply ensure
through direct review of vague-law enforcements that illegitimate
reasons did not play a role. But the Court recognized that the broad
discretion created by vague laws effectively shielded such decisions
from antidiscrimination review. As a prophylactic to guard against
discrimination, therefore, the Court required legislative specificity. To
144. See discussion of Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), supra notes 98-104 and
accompanying text.
145. Several courts and commentators have recognized the difficulty of identifying
discriminatory motives in a broadly discretionary decision. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758-59 (1988) (noting that discretion in city licensing process
allows discrimination against "unfavorable[] expression"); David H. Gans, Strategic Facial
Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1361-62 (2005) (observing that broad discretion makes
discrimination difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis); Note, Constitutional Risks to Equal
Protection in the Criminal Justice System, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2098, 2104-05 (2001) (observing
that broad discretion gives rise to cloaked racial discrimination).
146. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 168-71 (invalidating an anti-vagrancy statute); Kolender
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359-62 (1983) (invalidating a law requiring citizens to provide "credible
and reliable" identification).
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the extent that legislatures can delegate a comparably broad degree of
discretion to police through specific rules, judicial detection of
discrimination should be similarly ineffective.
Thus, by referring complaints of excessive specific-rule
discretion to the Equal Protection Clause, the Whren Court failed to
appreciate its earlier insight that antidiscrimination review of broad
discretion is impractical, an insight of considerable merit. Consider
why. Antidiscrimination review requires comparing cases treated
differently to determine whether the difference in treatment is
explainable by reference to legitimate factors that distinguish them, or
whether the cases are similar in all legitimate respects, raising an
inference that an illegitimate factor motivated the difference in
treatment. Identifying illegitimate motivations is facilitated when the
legitimate factors on which the decision may be made are relatively
few and when the weight to be accorded each factor is known and
measurable. In such circumstances, the legitimate differences between
cases can be ruled out more easily. In contrast, identifying an
illegitimate motivation is complicated when a greater number of
legitimate factors may enter a decision and when the decisionmaker
has greater flexibility regarding the weight accorded to each factor. In
these circumstances, the probability is comparatively higher that
some legitimate explanation involving some combination of relevant
factors weighted in some way will happen to be consistent with the
decision, even if the proffered explanation was not the actual reason
for the decision.
Discretion decreases the likelihood that an illegitimate
motivation behind a decision will be detected because it increases the
range of legitimate explanations that can be articulated in defense of
the decision. Discretion means that the decisionmaker has a broad
range of choice, either as to which factors to base the decision on or
how much weight to give to each factor, or both. Total discretion tends
toward an infinite number of factors that may be relied upon and
complete prerogative over the weight to be given each. There is thus
an inverse relationship between the degree of discretion a
decisionmaker has and the ability to rule out legitimate explanations
for a decision that was in fact motivated by an illegitimate reason.
The inverse relationship between discretion and
antidiscrimination review serves to explain the difficulty of proving
discrimination in a variety of contexts in which discretion is broad.
Consider, for example, prosecutorial charging decisions. In United
States v. Armstrong, the defendant proffered evidence that the District
Attorney's office was targeting black defendants selectively for federal
crack prosecutions sufficient to convince the District Court to order
discovery from the government regarding its criteria for prosecuting
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crack defendants under federal law. 147 The government refused to
comply, and the trial court dismissed the charges. 148 Reversing, the
Supreme Court held that the trial judge abused her discretion in
ordering discovery from the government before the defendant had
made a more convincing showing that the government had failed to
prosecute similarly situated white defendants. 49 By "similarly
situated," the Court seems to mean indistinguishable on any grounds
that might explain declining to prosecute white defendants while
subjecting black defendants to federal prosecution. Only then would
an inference that race played a role in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion be sufficiently convincing. After Armstrong, courts should
not permit even an inquiry into a plausible allegation of racial
discrimination unless the defendant can already demonstrate
convincingly that other similarly situated suspects of a different race
were ignored. Given the myriad facts and circumstances unique to
each crime and the broad discretion accorded prosecutors over which
to charge, it would be extremely difficult to make the requisite
showing. My research has disclosed no case in which a defendant
successfully demonstrated that his prosecution was racially motivated
or, after Armstrong, any case in which the defendant was granted
discovery to obtain support for such a showing. 150 Hopefully, racial-
and other illegitimate-discrimination in prosecutorial charging is
exceptional, but the broad discretion vested in such decisions suggests
that we will never know.
The context of capital sentencing reveals that, even when a
defendant can prove a statistically significant pattern of
discrimination across cases, proving discrimination in a particular
case remains extremely difficult. In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court
assumed the validity of a sophisticated statistical study
demonstrating that juries in Georgia systematically favor imposing
the death penalty on defendants found guilty of murdering white
147. 517 U.S. 456, 459 (1996).
148. Id. at 461.
149. Id. at 469-71.
150. Conversely, courts have dismissed claims of racial discrimination for failing to meet
Armstrong's rigorous standard. See United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 1996)
(finding against black defendant who claimed his traffic stop "was motivated by a race-based
drug courier profile" because he "failed to meet the rigorous standard for proving such a
violation" imposed by Armstrong); United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding
that black bicyclist stopped for lack of headlamp who "showed the only people arrested for
violating the statute during a certain month were black" and that "there are no lights on 98% of
all bicycles in the Des Moines area, which is populated predominantly by white people" did not
meet his Armstrong burden, as he "presented no evidence about the number of white bicyclists
who ride their bicycles between sunset and sunrise," though police admitted they had "targeted"
a high-crime area "populated primarily by minorities" (cited and described as above in Lafave,
supra note 81, at 1861 n.99).
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victims. 15 1 The evidence also suggested that prosecutors were more
likely to seek the death penalty in cases involving white victims.'
52
Nonetheless, the Court rejected the defendant's claim that the risk of
discrimination warranted reversal of his death sentence. The Court
reasoned that the composition of each jury is unique and therefore the
evidence of past jury discrimination did not establish that his
particular jury had acted on racial grounds. 153 With respect to the risk
of prosecutorial discrimination in seeking the death penalty, the Court
viewed the sample as insufficiently large with respect to the particular
prosecutor to establish a pattern of racial discrimination. 154 Although
the Court expressed concern that capital punishment in Georgia
appeared to be racially biased, it simply observed that with discretion
comes the risk of its abuse and that it is for the legislature to
determine whether that risk is too great. 155 My research has disclosed
no case before or after McCleskey in which a defendant has
successfully challenged his death sentence as racially biased, despite
continued evidence that the race of the victim plays a statistically
significant role in capital sentencing. 156
Peremptory challenges in jury selection also reveal the
difficulty of proving racial discrimination by a decisionmaker vested
with broad discretion. Traditionally, the peremptory challenge could
be based on any reason and did not require explanation. In a line of
cases beginning with Batson v. Kentucky, however, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to forbid the exercise of
peremptory challenges based on race or sex.'5 7 Here, the results are a
151. 481 U.S. 279, 292 n.7 (1987).
152. Id. at 286-87.
153. Id. at 293-95.
154. Id. at 297 n. 17 ("Requiring a prosecutor to rebut a study that analyzes the past conduct
of scores of prosecutors is quite different from requiring a prosecutor to rebut a contemporaneous
challenge to his own acts.").
155. Id. at 312-13, 319.
156. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Learning Law Through the Lens of Race, 21 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 16
(2005) (quoting Professor Sam Gross, whose findings show that defendants "charged with killing
white victims are far more likely to be sentenced to death than those who were charged with
killing black victims"); see also David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in
the Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special
Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194, 202 (2003) (reviewing numerous
post-1990 studies and finding widespread race-of-victim discrimination by juries in imposing the
death penalty); Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of
Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 644 n.120 (1998) (citing sources indicating that
prosecutorial decisions to seek death penalty appear to be influenced by race of victim).
157. 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1994)
(holding that peremptory challenges based on gender violate the Equal Protection Clause);
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 46-59 (1992) (holding that the Constitution prohibits a
criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the
exercise of peremptory challenges); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 617-18
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qualified failure. Given the vast range of race-and-sex-neutral factors
on which a litigant can purport to base a peremptory challenge,
identifying those instances in which race or sex played a motivating
role has proved notoriously difficult.15  There have been cases in which
Batson challenges were successful. However, the great weight of
opinion is that such cases are rare, reach a fraction of actual cases of
discriminatory challenges, and involve circumstances in which a
litigant has, in view of the trial judge, struck a series of jurors of a
particular race without any apparent non-racial rationale. 159 The
conventional view is that a litigant gets at least one and probably two
bites at discrimination before there is any risk that the trial judge will
find a racially discriminatory motive. 160 Justice Thurgood Marshall's
concurrence in Batson was probably on the mark: the only way to
prevent racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges
is to eliminate them altogether.
16'
The difficulty of proving discrimination within broad discretion
also can be seen outside the criminal justice system. Employment
decisions, such as hiring and firing, are more easily monitored for
racial discrimination when the permissible grounds for such decisions
are limited, rather than "at will," facilitating cross-case
(1991) (holding that a private litigant in a civil case may not use peremptory challenges on
account of race); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (holding that a defendant in a criminal
case can raise the third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the prosecution
because of their race); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of
race).
158. See Amanda S. Hitchcock, "Deference Does Not By Definition Preclude Relief" The
Impact of Miller-El V. Dretke on Batson Review in North Carolina Capital Appeals, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 1328, 1334 (2006) (arguing that Batson is essentially meaningless); Jere W. Morehead,
When a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure to
Eradicate Invidious Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 633 (1994)
(arguing that, because of Batson's evidentiary requirements, courts are unable to detect
illegitimate stereotypes on which litigants rely in selecting juries); Antony Page, Batson's Blind-
Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 179-80
(2005) (noting that race-based challenges continue despite Batson because "courts are not
equipped to evaluate the validity of a litigant's purportedly neutral explanations"); Shari
Seidman Diamond et al., Realistic Responses to the Limitations of Batson v. Kentucky, 7
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 77, 80-83 (1997) (discussing the minimal effect of Batson).
159. See Lucy Adams, Death by Discretion: Who Decides Who Lives and Dies in the United
States of America?, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 381, 399 (2005) (citing different extreme prosecutorial
explanations that have survived a Batson challenge); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice:
What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447,
459 (1996) (citing statistics showing that success rates of Batson challenges by criminal
defendants are very low).
160. See Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory
Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517, 554-55 (1992) (indicating that parties now just have to know
how much discrimination is allowed before judicial intervention).
161. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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comparisons. 16 2  Consider also that the use of race in college
admissions for affirmative action purposes is facilitated by the degree
of discretion vested in admissions officers. 163 Indeed, this may explain
why conservatives increasingly advocate exclusive reliance on
"standardized" criteria rather than simply excluding race from an
otherwise broadly discretionary decision; the exclusive use of
standardized criteria would facilitate determining whether admissions
officers were engaging covertly in racially preferential decisions.
164
Finally, consider the placement of children in child custody disputes
and in adoption cases, contexts in which consideration of race
continues to be controversial. 165 It is commonly recognized that the
broad discretion conferred in child placement agencies and family
courts by the "best interests" standard frustrates the ability to
determine the extent to which placement decisions are based on
race. 166
Turning to the context of traffic stops, the foregoing analysis
suggests that a motorist who was discriminated against would have
little chance of proving it. As previously noted, the broad array of
traffic laws affords the officer, as an initial matter, the ability to
readily identify a traffic violation as a justification for the stop.
Furthermore, under Whren, the officer is permitted pretextually to
single out motorists from observed traffic violators for objectives
unrelated to the traffic violation, even without reasonable suspicion to
162. Donna E. Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and Employment At-Will, 34
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 351, 402 (2001) (suggesting that it is too hard to detect discrimination when a
case is not an exception to the at-will rule).
163. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME
COURT 156 (1988) (noting that discretion in admissions allowed by Bakke permitted affirmative
action).
164. See Robert P. George, Gratz and Grutter: Some Hard Questions, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1634, 1639 (2003) (noting that discrimination can be accomplished as long as it is hidden in the
admissions process and calling those admission policies "clearly unconstitutional"); Terence J.
Pell, Editorial, Camouflage for Quotas, WASH. POST., June 30, 2003, at A15 (critiquing hidden
discriminatory admissions policies at major universities).
165. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Cultural Stereotypes Can and Do Die: It's Time to Move on with
Transracial Adoption, 34 J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & THE L. 315, 315-20 (2006)
(discussing the controversy and evolution of race considerations in adoption); Kim Forde-Mazrui,
Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 925, 932-42 (1994) (describing the battles over transracial adoption among adoption
agencies and in the courts); Christine M. Metteer, A Law Unto Itself: The Indian Child Welfare
Act as Inapplicable and Inappropriate to the Transracial/Race-Matching Adoption Controversy,
38 BRANDEIS L.J. 47, 47-52 (1999) (showing the controversy that has developed regarding racial
considerations in child-placement).
166. See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY AND
ADOPTION 375-76 (2003) (showing a case where a judge was able to hide a race-based custody
decision through discretion); R. Richard Banks, Intimacy and Racial Equality: The Limits of
Antidiscrimination, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 455, 474 n.106 (2003) (book review) (noting ways
that discretion in child placement can allow for racial considerations).
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support the ulterior objective. Accordingly, to prove a racial motive the
defendant would have to establish that the officer ignored motorists of
a different race who violated the same traffic laws, in the same or
more egregious manner, and that there were no circumstances in
defendant's case supporting an ulterior police motive for which the
traffic stop served as a pretext. Within the large pool of traffic
violators, innumerable circumstances may distinguish motorists from
one another if, as Whren permits, the circumstances need not relate to
the traffic violation. For example, even if a suspect could identify other
comparable or even more egregious traffic violators known to, but
ignored by, the same police officer who stopped him, the officer could
readily offer factual differences between the suspect and the other
motorists that were suspicious to the officer, although not legally
sufficient to justify the stop independent of the traffic violation. Such
differences could include the age, posture, gesture, hair, or clothing of
the driver, the appearance or number of his passengers, the make,
model or condition of the vehicle, or the direction from which the
vehicle was coming. Even if such factors were not particularly
probative of suspicious activity, the permissibility of pretextual stops
and the presumption of good faith accorded police officers would
almost always lead a court to credit any race-neutral explanation
given for the stop.1
6 7
Indeed, per Armstrong, the defendant would have to make a
convincing showing that the officer ignored motorists similarly
situated in all respects before a court would permit him to inquire, or
otherwise discover from the officer, anything about the reasons he
stopped the defendant or whether and why he had ignored other
motorists.1 68 In contrast to Armstrong, moreover, even a showing of
similarly situated motorists that were not stopped may not constitute
a sufficient showing of discrimination to justify further inquiry from
the officer. The impossibility of stopping all speeding motorists means
an officer could claim plausibly, even if falsely, that he had to make a
167. William Stuntz observes that the ability for an officer to point to a traffic violation as
the reason for stopping a black motorist enables the officer to readily identify a race-neutral
explanation for the stop. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, supra note 38, at 871-72. My point goes further
in that an officer's ability to point to a pretextual reason as the basis for selecting among traffic
violators gives an officer virtually limitless reasons to justify a stop even where the motorist can
show the police ignored other motorists who were violating the traffic laws more egregiously
than he was.
168. Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial Profiling After
Whren v. United States: The New York and New Jersey Responses Compared, 63 ALB. L. REV.
725, 729-33 (2000) (demonstrating the two ways to challenge a race-based arrest in court and
stating the limitations following Armstrong and Whren).
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selection from among identically offending motorists. 169 Consider also
that even if statistical evidence were available that suggested the
police department for which the officer works has engaged in racial
profiling, McCleskey suggests that courts would find such evidence
inadequate unless it contained a sufficient sample of stops by the
particular officer in question, and then only if non-racial grounds
could be ruled out to explain the stop in the instant case. And
although peremptory challenges have been successful occasionally,
such occasions are rare, tend to involve a stark pattern of suspicious
strikes by a particular litigant, and, perhaps most importantly, occur
in view of the trial judge, who could observe the same circumstances
on which the litigant purportedly relied. In contrast, in determining
the circumstances surrounding an allegedly discriminatory traffic
stop, the trial judge would have to rely entirely on the respective
accounts of the officer, who enjoys a presumption of good faith, and a
defendant, who is usually before the judge because evidence of more
serious criminal activity was discovered during the traffic stop.
Although a discriminatory purpose may be identifiable under unusual
circumstances, the breadth of discretion conferred by traffic laws
suggests that such circumstances would have to be extreme.
Accordingly, it would seem that the traffic stop is more "peremptory"
than the peremptory challenge. 170 The risk of racial profiling,
moreover, is heightened by the extent to which race is believed by law
enforcement to predict criminality.1 71 Law-abiding people and public
officials, who generally desire to comply with legal proscriptions on
racial discrimination, may nonetheless find it difficult to ignore race
when they believe attention to it serves laudable purposes. 72 For
example, college admissions officers, child placement workers, and
litigants selecting juries may find it difficult to be colorblind when
they believe attention to race would serve, respectively, to rectify
racial injustice, benefit the interests of children, or ensure a jury
sympathetic to their case. If police believe racial profiling contributes
169. Realistically, one police officer can only stop and question or ticket three to six vehicles
per hour. E-mail from James Walker to author, supra note 127. If, for example, one thousand
vehicles per hour are going past the officer's position and 82% are violating a low posted speed
limit, the officer can easily claim that the failure to stop other vehicles of equal or greater speed
was unavoidable.
170. "Peremptory," including as used in the term "peremptory challenge," refers to a decision
that is final, absolute, or not requiring any shown cause. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1172 (8th ed.
2004).
171. See Karlan, supra note 38, at 2006 (describing several studies of police behavior
showing that race is a factor in profiling); Roberts, supra note 27, at 806-807 ("Police officers are
particularly notorious for using race as a proxy for criminal propensity.").
172. See KENNEDY, supra note 166, at 376 (recounting how a judge allowed evidence
regarding an interracial relationship and later said that race did not affect his decision).
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effectively to law enforcement, the incentive for officers to take
account of race is high. To the extent that the Equal Protection Clause
is ineffective at identifying and therefore deterring such tendencies,
an expectation that police will ignore race is unrealistic. Accordingly,
by referring the defendant in Whren to the Equal Protection Clause in
the face of the broad discretion conferred by traffic regulations, the
Court effectively denied any meaningful safeguard against racial, or
other illegitimate, discrimination.
III. REMEDIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
According to the foregoing analysis, legislatures can delegate
virtually limitless discretion to police through specific rules, and the
Court's antidiscrimination response is inadequate to check the abuse
of such discretion. This raises the question of what, if anything, can be
done to limit the degree of discretion that can be delegated through
specific rules. Section A considers some strategies courts might
employ to reduce the discretion delegated to executive officials
through specific rules. Section B considers potential constitutional
objections to their implementation. As before, the primary focus of
analysis will be traffic enforcement.
Two clarifications of scope are worth emphasis at the outset.
First, my aim is not to propose a uniquely effective approach to limit
police discretion. A rich body of scholarship discusses a variety of
promising, if imperfect, approaches to managing police discretion. 173
Making practical improvements to such approaches is outside my
expertise. Rather, my objective is to draw on the previous analysis of
the relationship between rule specificity, discretion, and
antidiscrimination to identify key factors and considerations that
could inform the design of discretion-reducing measures. I will also
note, without attempting to resolve, some difficulties that such
strategies would encounter.
Second, my aim is not to engage directly the ongoing debate
over precisely how much discretion police should have and whether
173. See generally, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975) (discussing policies
and research regarding discretionary enforcement by police officers); Cole, supra note 27
(summarizing and criticizing popular critiques of and approaches to police discretion); Joseph
Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the
Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960) (discussing how visibility of non-enforcement
can be increased and evaluated); Jeffries, supra note 26 (discussing how to properly balance
factors affecting judicial and law enforcement discretion in creating penal law); Kahan & Meares,
supra note 27 (arguing for an abandonment of close judicial control of police discretion on the
grounds that minorities can now effectively protect themselves through the political process);
Livingston, Police Discretion, supra note 27 (calling for a rejection of vagueness doctrine
enforcement against community based, order enforcement policing).
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limits thereto should be political or judicial. Difficult questions will
persist over the extent to which police discretion, including in traffic
enforcement, is justified in the interests of crime control and the war
on terrorism. My claim is limited to the widely accepted proposition
that some limit on police discretion is required by the rule of law, and
my inquiry asks-assuming legislatures fail to design specific laws
that constrain discretion within meaningful limits-how might courts
place some limits on discretion consistent with their constitutional
role.17
4
A. Remedial Strategies for Limiting Specific-Rule Discretion
As we have seen, police discretion derives from freedom of
enforcement choice in both affirmative and negative directions, that is,
having a large pool of potential targets to enforce affirmatively against
and having broad latitude in declining to enforce the law even when
authorized to do so. Accordingly, constraints on police discretion
should involve either limiting the scope of affirmative enforcement
choice or of negative non-enforcement choice, or both. Limiting
affirmative choice would require narrowing the authority to subject
motorists to enforcement action, while limiting negative choice would
require reducing the authority to ignore motorists who violate the law.
Constraining the degree of affirmative and negative choice
delegated through specific rules should address those factors that tend
to create unfettered discretion and the doctrinal impediments to
checking the abuse of such discretion. As the previous analysis of
traffic laws reveals, broad discretion can be delegated through specific
rules through a confluence of various factors and circumstances, which
include criminalizing conduct that is: commonly engaged in; largely
innocuous, harmless or trivial; impractical or inconvenient to avoid;
and significantly underenforced. Furthermore, politicians and the
public are largely indifferent to minor violations, and police are
unaccountable for under-enforcement due to the invisibility of non-
enforcement and the public indifference toward the violations. At the
same time, police have strong incentives to exploit the benefits of
pretextual enforcement for purposes other than preventing the
conduct that legally justifies the enforcement. Finally, current
constitutional doctrines not only expressly permit pretextual
174. Thus, if legislatures revised traffic laws so that only hazardous violations were illegal
and speed limits were set to define the normal safe driving behavior of the average motorist as
legal, courts would not need to consider imposing limitations on enforcement discretion.
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enforcement, but they also make it impractical to prove illegitimate
enforcement motivations.
Ameliorating the risks of discretion created by specific rules
could begin with reforms to the Equal Protection and Fourth
Amendment doctrines that, as currently conceived, preclude effective
constraints on arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Regarding
equal protection, curbing the discriminatory enforcement of traffic
laws without disabling their enforcement altogether could be pursued
by easing the burden of proving discriminatory intent. A useful change
could be to shift the burden of proof to the government when
enforcement of certain laws appears to have a substantial
discriminatory impact. Borrowing from employment discrimination
law175  and other disparate-impact doctrines, 176  prohibiting
discrimination would be more effective if discriminatory impact
triggered a presumption of discriminatory intent, rather than
requiring proof of actual intent. The Court in McCleskey in fact gave
serious consideration to applying the employment discrimination
framework to juries, but concluded that the uniqueness of each jury
made any inference based on patterns of past jury behavior
unfounded. 177  Statistical evidence may be more probative in
evaluating the motives of individual police officers than individual
juries. To the extent that law enforcement agencies can be expected to
175. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that employer must
show how a business practice relates to job performance if that practice is discriminatory in
effect); Keith R. Fentonmiller, The Continuing Validity of Disparate Impact Analysis for Federal-
Sector Age Discrimination Claims, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1071, 1074-81 (1998) (giving a brief history
and explanation of the difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact in
employment law).
176. The Supreme Court has applied disparate impact analysis, or something close to it, in
the context of jury selection, school desegregation, electoral procedures, welfare, public facilities,
and municipal services. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice" The
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 833 (1993) (observing
that some federal courts have been more willing to infer discriminatory intent from disparate
impact in the context of municipal services than in the context of environmental justice claims);
Daniel Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989)
(demonstrating throughout that, in the context of housing, employment, jury selection, electoral
procedures, and school desegregation, the Court has been willing to infer discriminatory intent
on what is essentially a showing of discriminatory impact); Joelle S. Weiss, Controlling HV-
Positive Women's Procreative Destiny: A Critical Equal Protection Analysis, 2 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 643, 682 n.189 ("Similarly, the Supreme Court has applied the disparate impact
model in the voting, welfare, education, and public facilities contexts."); see also Natonabah v.
Bd. of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 716, 724 (D.N.M. 1973) (applying disparate impact theory in
educational setting); Fair Hous. Council v. Ayres, 855 F. Supp. 315, 318 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(applying disparate impact theory to housing).
177. 481 U.S. 279, 293-95 (1987) ("[Because] each jury is unique in its composition... the
application of an inference drawn from the general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and
sentencing simply is not comparable to the application of an inference drawn from general
statistics to a specific venire-selection or Title VII case.").
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train individual officers to follow department-wide enforcement
policies, a pattern of disparate enforcement practices by a police
department plausibly has some probative value in assessing an
officer's motivation in an individual case. A substantial disparate
impact at least suggests that the law may be especially prone to
discriminatory enforcement, justifying closer judicial scrutiny of police
motives.
Fourth Amendment doctrines could also be reformed, especially
the two doctrines previously discussed that enhance the exploitative
value of enforcing traffic laws for purposes unrelated to the traffic
violation. The first doctrine, per Whren, is the permissibility of
admittedly pretextual enforcement. Second, per Atkins, police are
permitted, if authorized by state law, to arrest and search the person
and vehicle of a motorist who violates even a minor traffic law, which
in turn affords the opportunity to find evidence of other crimes. Traffic
laws thus afford police the ability to investigate any crime they want,
including searching the vehicle for evidence thereof, without first
having reasonable suspicion of the investigated crime. Prohibiting
either pretextual enforcement of traffic laws or the search and seizure
of motorists who commit only minor traffic violations would reduce the
benefits of pretextual enforcement and thereby tend to encourage
enforcement only in situations in which the traffic violation is serious
enough by itself to motivate enforcement.
Invalidating pretextual stops also would facilitate
antidiscrimination review for arbitrary and discriminatory motives.
By requiring that police only target violators because of the violation
itself, rather than as a pretext for investigating other crimes, an anti-
pretext doctrine would limit the range of reasons an officer could
expressly rely on in enforcing the laws. By minimizing the list of
reasons for targeting particular motorists, police would have less
opportunity to explain discriminatory or arbitrary decisions by
reference to pretextual suspicions. Moreover, the very inquiry into
whether a pretextual reason motivated an enforcement decision could
lead to more direct evidence of illegitimate intent. Accordingly, an
anti-pretext doctrine would not only minimize the exploitation of
traffic laws to pursue unsubstantiated suspicion of other crimes, but
would serve to minimize the risk of racial, and other illegitimate,
discriminations as well. Moreover, even if some pretextual or
discriminatory stops still occurred, a further prohibition on searching
or arresting the suspected traffic violator would tend to minimize the
intrusiveness to motorists of potentially discriminatory traffic stops.
Reforming Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection doctrines
thus should have some ameliorative effect in checking the enforcement
of traffic laws based on arbitrary, discriminatory, and pretextual
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reasons. These strategies would be limited, however. First, given the
ease with which a traffic violation could be substantiated, it would be
difficult to prove the officer's enforcement was not motivated by
unlawful conduct, but instead by a pretextual or discriminatory
motive. Also, even a disparate-impact approach to proving
discrimination, while more promising than current doctrine in
detecting discrimination, has at least two significant limitations. One
is that such an approach depends on having reliable data on the race
of motorists stopped and those overlooked. Expecting police who act on
discriminatory motives to record accurately the race of the motorists
they stop may be unrealistic. Creating records of violators not stopped,
a necessary comparison group to establish a disparate impact, would
be particularly difficult given the invisibility of unenforced minor
traffic violations. Finally, even to the extent that these doctrinal
reforms would help to curb traffic enforcement based on race or other
documentable traits, they would not address the risk that police would
enforce traffic laws in idiosyncratic or arbitrary ways that would not
necessarily produce an observable pattern, but would, nonetheless,
raise rule-of-law concerns. To the extent that police remain indifferent
to minor traffic violations for their own sake and unaccountable for
under-enforcement, they will inevitably resort to motivations-
unrelated to the violation-that will vary from one officer to the next.
Finally, although reforming Fourth Amendment doctrine to preclude
arrest or search for minor traffic violations would reduce the police
incentives to stop motorists pretextually, the ease with which police
can obtain consensual searches largely would preserve the value of
pretextual traffic stops.
178
An alternative strategy would seek to limit negative
enforcement choice by making enforcement for enforcement's sake
more obligatory, or at least more attractive. Increasing police
incentives to enforce the law against known violators could be
achieved in a number of ways. One way would be to focus on
increasing enforcement rates. The most straightforward approach
would mandate full enforcement, that is, require police to stop
everyone that they have reasonable suspicion to believe has violated
the law and arrest everyone that they have probable cause to believe
the same. Full enforcement is the official posture of the German legal
system. As Professor George Fletcher explains, the rule of law, as
understood in German jurisprudence, requires that all crimes be
punished; enforcement discretion, in theory, does not include declining
178. See Lafave, supra note 81 at 1891-93 (explaining that police routinely request consent to
search a vehicle during a traffic stop, and consent is granted in the overwhelming majority of
cases, including by motorists carrying contraband, and citing sources).
[Vol. 60:5:14971542
RULING OUT THE RULE OF LAW
to enforce a provable violation of law. 179 In terms of traffic laws, full
enforcement would require the police to stop every motorist they
observe violating the law. Predictability should be enhanced because a
violation of the law in view of the police would always trigger
enforcement.
This strategy would create its own difficulties. First, current
levels of enforcement resources fall far short of what would be
necessary to fully enforce traffic laws, at least until the rate of
violation could be reduced dramatically. Until such time, moreover, if
full enforcement were attempted by concentrating a large number of
officers in a small area, traffic would grind to a virtual halt, with the
serious risk of high-speed rear-end crashes, as unsuspecting motorists
approached the back of the slow moving queue. Additionally,
monitoring non-enforcement is, as a practical matter, virtually
impossible. These are crimes that usually have no victims or other
harm, or witnesses motivated to complain, at least with regard to
minor infractions. It is therefore unlikely that courts could identify
non-enforcement decisions. Indeed, as discussed previously, the low
visibility of these crimes is in part the cause of their under-
enforcement in the first place. Even if non-enforcement actions were
documented, it would be difficult to verify that the officer knew of the
violation and ignored it. Proving that an omission was intentional is
more difficult than proving that affirmative conduct was
intentional.180 The fact that some states have full enforcement
statutes that continue to be ineffective illustrates the difficulty of
mandating full enforcement even when legislatures, and not just
courts, mandate such policies.
To the other end of the enforcement-rate continuum, rather
than requiring full enforcement, courts could require some minimal
level of enforcement so that enforcement would not be rare. If
enforcement were rare in relation to the frequency of violation, courts
could invalidate or enjoin enforcement of those laws. Such an
approach would be akin to the common law doctrine of desuetude,
which holds laws invalid that are so rarely enforced as to in effect
have been abandoned or rendered obsolete.18 1 The risk that a law
would be invalidated due to non-enforcement would exert pressure on
police to enforce the laws at least occasionally to maintain their
179. See GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 207 (1998) (contrasting the
American and German legal systems).
180. See generally Francis Barry McCarthy, Crimes of Omission in Pennsylvania, 68 TEMP.
L. REV. 633, 637-38 (1995) (discussing the evolution of omissions as criminal in light of the actus
reus requirement).




validity. Desuetude also has an evidentiary advantage over mandating
full enforcement because determining whether there have been any
enforcement actions at all, a matter of public record, should be more
readily achieved than determining whether there have been any
declined enforcements, a matter of which there likely would be no
record.
The practical value of desuetude for curbing arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement, however, would be minimal. First, few
laws are virtually never enforced, so few laws would be vulnerable to
invalidation. Moreover, it would have no application to the context
under consideration: traffic enforcement. While speeding and other
traffic and vehicle regulations are significantly underenforced, they
are still enforced in non-trivial numbers. Indeed, the public
controversy over the pretextual use of traffic laws for drug interdiction
purposes or on the basis of race stems from the repeated enforcement
of traffic laws. A doctrine of desuetude would afford some protection to
people against the arbitrary invocation of a law that is virtually never
enforced, such as failing to honk while passing, 18 2 but it would do little
to address the common use of speeding and other low-level traffic laws
for drug enforcement or public order policing, including pursuing
these enforcement objectives in a discriminatory manner.
The foregoing strategies seek to reduce negative enforcement
choice, that is, to make under-enforcement more difficult. An
alternative strategy to reducing police discretion would seek to limit
affirmative choice, i.e., reduce the opportunities to enforce the law.
Courts could narrow the pool of violators from which police could
select enforcement targets by narrowing the range of conduct that
authorizes enforcement. In the context of traffic violations, courts
could limit what constitutes an enforceable traffic violation to conduct
that is endangering, hazardous, or otherwise seriously objectionable
by community standards. Interestingly, while narrowing enforcement
to more serious violations would reduce affirmative enforcement
authority, it also would tend to limit negative enforcement discretion,
because it would increase police incentives to enforce the law when
enforcement is authorized. Police would be unlikely to ignore
dangerous or otherwise serious misconduct, and the public would
complain if they did. This would involve courts in a kind of
substantive due process review, invalidating or enjoining enforcement
of traffic violations that were insufficiently serious. In contrast to
182. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-15-4(1) (2007) (requiring "a timely, audible signal" while
overtaking). Other criminal activities that could fall under the desuetude doctrine include
collecting seaweed at night, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207:48 (2007), and impersonating an
auctioneer or corder of wood, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-14-2 (2007).
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conventional substantive due process, however, the rationale would
not be that engaging in minor traffic violations constitutes a
fundamental liberty interest, but rather that such violations are too
trivial under contemporary community standards to motivate
enforcement to a sufficiently predictable degree.18 3 Thus, for example,
if speeding were enforced unpredictably in the first five or ten miles
over a posted limit, a court could require that speeding violations only
be enforced when exceeding ten miles over the limit,1 8 4 or when traffic
or weather conditions make speeding within the first ten miles over
the limit hazardous and therefore predictably subject to police
intervention. 8 5 This strategy thus would limit affirmative choice by
precluding enforcement against minor traffic violations and would
indirectly limit negative choice by making the violations that may be
enforced too politically costly to ignore. By reducing discretion
accordingly, enforcement should be sufficiently consistent and
predictable by reference to legitimate law enforcement objectives.
Limiting enforcement to serious traffic violations as a means to
reducing discretion is supported by experience with capital
punishment. At first blush, a comparison between misdemeanor traffic
violations and capital crimes may seem inapposite. But consider that
capital sentencing is also a context in which specifically defined crimes
can create excessive discretion. In addition to invalidating some
capital sentencing criteria on vagueness grounds, the Supreme Court
has invalidated capital sentencing schemes that use reasonably
specific elements of murder, but which failed adequately to narrow the
183. William Stuntz suggests a different rationale for precluding enforcement of minor
traffic violations, namely, that they should not count as "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment because conscientious, law abiding citizens would not expect minor speeding to
trigger enforcement. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, supra note 38, at 871-72. There may not be any
meaningful difference between substantively invalidating minor traffic crimes on the one hand
and holding their enforcement unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment on the other. If
enforcement of certain minor traffic violations were precluded as unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, even when the evidence of the violation is clear, then such laws would be in effect
as inoperative as if they were directly invalidated under the Due Process Clause.
184. The ten-mile-over rule described above is meant only as an example of what rate might
be optimal for a particular highway in light of the posted limit, road conditions, and enforcement
patterns. A more general approach, informed by traffic safety engineers, would be to set the
enforceable speed limit on each road at between the 80th and 90th percentile speed of free
flowing traffic under good conditions. A lower speed limit could be enforced when poor conditions
warranted it. For further explanation of the "85th percentile rule," see supra note 127.
185. William Stuntz makes an analogous suggestion in the Fourth Amendment context,
namely, that the reasonableness of a traffic stop ought to be based on local custom and
enforcement policy rather than whether the speed limit was technically violated, so that stops
would be authorized only when speeding violations were serious enough that police regularly
enforce them against all drivers. See Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, supra note 38, at 872.
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pool of convicted murderers "eligible" to receive the death penalty- 8 6
The effect of these schemes had been that the death penalty was
imposed rarely and under circumstances that were indistinguishable
from the great majority of murder convictions that led to sentences of
incarceration.18 7 The Court recognized that requiring conviction for
murder, even first degree murder as defined in many states, as a
condition for capital punishment did not guard adequately against the
risk that juries would impose the death penalty in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner. To enhance the consistency and predictability
of capital punishment, the Court now requires at least one
aggravating circumstance in addition to the traditional elements of
capital murder.188 Similarly, in the traffic context, even when the laws
are reasonably specific, violation thereof does not narrow adequately
the pool of motorists "eligible" to be stopped sufficiently to make stops
consistent and predictable. Were courts to require the existence of
aggravating circumstances, such as hazardous speeding or swerving,
in addition to the elements of a minor traffic violation before the
violation would be eligible for enforcement, the risk that the
enforcement selection decision would be arbitrary or discriminatory
should be reduced. The aggravating circumstances should be serious
enough to narrow the pool of enforcement-eligible motorists to an
acceptable degree.
Notice also that minimizing the risk of discriminatory
enforcement by narrowing the pool of violators is similar to the
anticipated effect of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. A primary
concern with vague laws was that they tended to cast a wide net,
authorizing police to enforce against a large pool of people.18 9 By
invalidating vague laws, courts left police to enforce laws with a
narrower focus, limiting the pool of potential suspects from whom to
select. As legislatures have increasingly overcriminalized through
specifically defined laws, police are able again to cast a wide net, with
186. See LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
LAW 95-103 (2004) (explaining constitutional requirement that, in addition to elements of first
degree murder, jury must find at least one aggravating circumstance before defendant is eligible
for death sentence in order to narrow the pool of death-eligible murderers); id. at 109-14
(explaining as distinct requirement that aggravating circumstances must be sufficiently specific
to guide discretion).
187. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]he
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death
has in fact been imposed.").
188. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (recognizing that jury discretion must
be curtailed by legislative guidelines governing application of the death penalty, and upholding
the Georgia statutory scheme requiring identification of aggravating factors).
189. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-66 (1972) (denouncing the
"wide net" of vague laws and the "arsenal" of power they provide to police and courts).
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broad discretion in selecting among the potential suspects. By limiting
enforcement to infractions that include aggravating circumstances,
law enforcement discretion can again be channeled in a more
principled manner.
Although invalidating or enjoining the enforcement of specific
laws that create broad discretion likely would reduce discretion, it
would not be unproblematic. Perhaps the most significant problem is a
lack of a determinable standard for assessing which specific laws
create excessive discretion. Just as collecting reliable data on
enforcement rates and on the discriminatory impact of enforcement
discussed above would be difficult, so too would be gathering
sufficiently probative data on the degree of discretion that a specific
law creates, alone or in combination with other laws. To the extent
that consistency and predictability are indicators of guided discretion,
a court would need reliable measures of how consistent and
predictable enforcement patterns were. In addition to the practical
challenge of measuring discretion, this strategy also raises a problem
of normative indeterminacy. That is, even if the breadth of discretion
created by specific laws could be measured reliably, determining
whether such discretion exceeds a tolerable degree would call for a
controversial and potentially arbitrary judgment. As discussed in the
next Section, the lack of a determinate standard for assessing which
specific laws create excessive discretion also calls into question the
constitutional legitimacy of courts engaging in such assessments.
The foregoing discretion-constraining strategies could be
combined to maximize effect. For example, requiring some narrowing
of the class of violators subject to enforcement could be combined with
measures designed to screen out illegitimate motivations. Indeed, the
two approaches would complement each other, in that the more
predictable enforcement is by limiting the circumstances that
authorize it, the more effectively cases could be compared to detect
discriminatory treatment of similar cases. A parallel to the void-for-
vagueness doctrine can be observed again. While the Court recognized
that reducing discretion was necessary to check the risk of
discriminatory enforcement, antidiscrimination review under the
Equal Protection Clause remained a supplementary check-one that
was made more effective by limiting enforcement to specifically
defined laws, the enforcement of which could be more easily compared
across cases than could the enforcement of vague laws.
We can also observe, as before, that affirmative choice and
negative choice are interdependent. Recall from the analysis in
Section II.A that increasing affirmative choice tends to increase
negative choice and vice-versa. Similarly, decreasing one type of choice
tends to decrease the other. Thus, as affirmative choice could be
2007] 1547
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
limited by prohibiting enforcement except when violations are serious,
negative choice would also tend to be limited because serious crimes
are more difficult for police to ignore. Or, as negative choice could be
limited by requiring greater levels of enforcement, stepped-up
enforcement would tend to deter violations, reducing the pool of
motorists subject to affirmative enforcement. As enforcement and
compliance rates increase, social norms also would reinforce the
objectionability of those violations, further reducing the rate of
violation and the affirmative opportunities for police to stop motorists.
With fewer violations, enforcement resources would be enhanced,
relative to the number of violations, limiting the political acceptability
of resource-based excuses for under-enforcement, and so on.
Implementing any of the foregoing strategies likely would
involve difficult trade-offs between law enforcement objectives and the
interests of motorists in even-handed treatment and between
legislative and executive policy choices on the one hand, and judicial
interventions on the other. The discussion in this Section has not
delved into these issues, much less sought to resolve them. The point
has not been to particularize the most effective means for controlling
police discretion, but rather to identify key strategies that could be
pursued to reduce the discretion of law enforcement created by specific
laws. If our nation is to protect the rule-of-law values that the
Constitution reflects, and upon which the void-for-vagueness doctrine
is premised, courts need to develop constraints on legislative
delegation of excessive discretion unless and until our political
institutions limit themselves. Whether courts have constitutional
authority to develop such approaches on their own initiative is the
inquiry of the next Section.
B. Constitutional Concerns Over Judicial Intervention
Although discretion cannot and should not be eliminated, we
have seen that approaches could be implemented that would reduce
discretion more than is currently achieved through existing doctrinal
constraints. Judicial intervention, however, raises its own
constitutional concerns about the legitimacy and competence of courts
to limit the breadth of discretion created by specific rules, such as
traffic laws. The Supreme Court expressed this concern in Whren:
Petitioners urge as an extraordinary factor in this case that the "multitude of applicable
traffic and equipment regulations" is so large and so difficult to obey perfectly that
virtually everyone is guilty of violation, permitting the police to single out almost
whomever they wish for a stop. But we are aware of no principle that would allow us to
decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that
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infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement.
And even if we could identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what standard
(or what right) we would decide, as petitioners would have us do, which particular
provisions are sufficiently important to merit enforcement. 190
The Court's refusal to invalidate enforcement of traffic laws
that vest police with broad discretion seems to reflect two related
constitutional concerns regarding judicial intervention: legitimacy and
manageability. With legitimacy, the concern is whether courts may
engage properly in functions constitutionally assigned to the
democratic institutions of government: the legislature and executive.
Regarding the legislative function, the point is that, for at least a
century, American jurisprudence has insisted on legislative
supremacy in defining the criminal law. Legislatures are
democratically accountable and therefore have greater political
legitimacy in defining the limits of lawful conduct. Legislatures are
also best suited in general to advance rule-of-law values, such as
equality and fair warning, because they act prospectively and with
generality, that is, without reference to particular individuals. Were
courts to constrain actively the circumstances under which motorists
were subject to laws enacted by the legislature, courts would arguably
be lawmaking. As to the executive function, to the extent that courts
would be scrutinizing and limiting enforcement policy, they arguably
would be usurping executive prerogative over law enforcement. If
limited resources preclude full enforcement of traffic laws, it is
arguably the responsibility of the police and other politically
accountable enforcement agencies to set enforcement priorities.
Whether conceived as lawmaking or executing, the concern is that
courts lack the constitutional authority to define or enforce traffic
policy.
Regarding manageability, the concern is whether courts have
judicially manageable standards in reviewing specific laws by which to
assess whether particular laws create sufficiently broad discretion to
warrant remedial intervention. In the context of traffic enforcement,
courts would need to identify which regulations are violated with
sufficient frequency, while at the same time substantially
underenforced as to be especially susceptible to arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. For example, do speed limits in a
particular jurisdiction or locale constitute such laws? If so, what speed
limit would narrow enforcement discretion adequately? Although
speed limits on many roads may present a fairly obvious example of
190. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1996).
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excessive discretion, 191 assessing the broad range of traffic and motor
vehicle regulations would involve significant uncertainty. Unless
courts competently can identify instances of excessive discretion
through specific laws and provide effective remedies, then judicial
intervention may not be justified in practice, even if justifiable in
theory.
The forgoing objections are serious and counsel caution in any
approach toward constraining police discretion through judicial
review. While the following responses suggest that the objections are
not dispositive, the responses are not either. The challenge is to strike
a balance between collective interests and individual rights, a balance
that cannot be defined easily or uncontroversially. With respect to the
legitimacy or separation-of-powers objection, the first response is that
judicial involvement under these circumstances, in fact, does not
undermine legislative supremacy; it promotes it. The concept of
legislative supremacy, despite its empowering connotation, includes a
significant restriction on legislative choice. Namely, legislatures may
not consent, through the delegation of broad discretion, to executive
lawmaking. Instead, legislative supremacy requires legislatures to
provide case-by-case guidance to executive officials, especially the
police, regarding what conduct should trigger law enforcement
procedures. The Court's nondelegation doctrine reflects this point by
requiring an intelligible principle when Congress delegates authority
to executive agencies, so that each agency decision can be justified by
reference to congressional instruction. If Congress were to delegate
authority to executive agencies through a standard so broad as to lack
an intelligible principle, such agencies would be engaged in
unconstitutional lawmaking, rather than executing. In the law
enforcement context, vague laws are objectionable because they vest
so much discretion in the police that "enforcement" decisions are, in
effect, lawmaking.192 Similarly, by creating excessive discretion
through specific traffic laws, legislatures have delegated lawmaking
authority to the police. 193 By constraining police discretion through the
191. As explained previously, see supra note 127 and accompanying text, the vast majority of
posted speed limits on major roads and highways define 50-90% of all drivers as criminals or
violators. This is particularly true in the eastern half of the country.
192. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) ("A vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an
ad hoc and subjective basis .... "); Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 27, at 559 (noting
that void-for-vagueness doctrine requires legislatures to specify crimes rather than delegating
their definition).
193. William Stuntz makes a similar observation. See Stuntz, Civil-Criminal Line, supra
note 131, at 24 ("When the state retains crimes that go largely unenforced, and gives prosecutors
and the police the power to decide which violators (if any) to charge or arrest, prosecutors and the
police become legislators; they have the practical power of crime definition. The essence of the
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strategies outlined in the previous Section, courts would help to
ensure that legislative criteria, rather than police whim, determine
each law enforcement action. In the end, judicial intervention is
arguably necessary both to preserve legislative supremacy in the
criminal law and to limit enforcement officials to the function of
enforcing law, rather than making it.
Second, even if legislative supremacy were undermined by
judicially imposed constraints on enforcing specific laws, it should be
recognized that the primary justification for legislative supremacy in
defining criminal law is based on a form of legislation that is lacking
here. A primary justification for legislative supremacy is that such
supremacy promotes the predictable and even-handed administration
of law. This presumes a form of legislative enactment that provides
meaningful, advance guidance to law enforcement. Although
legislation generally provides greater advanced guidance than
judicially created crimes, the void-for-vagueness doctrine recognizes
that vague laws defined by the legislature do not necessarily provide
adequate guidance and, as this Article has argued, specific laws do not
either. In developing the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the Court sought
to ensure that the presumed virtues of legislative supremacy would be
served by requiring legislatures to be more specific in defining crimes.
Similarly, with specific laws that fail to provide guidance sufficient to
promote the consistent and even-handed enforcement of the law,
courts may legitimately intervene to safeguard rule-of-law values,
such as consistency, predictability, and equality in the enforcement of
the law.
It is also worth noting that the court interventions suggested in
the previous Section do not constitute the kind of judicial crime
creation repudiated by modern American jurisprudence; instead, they
represent judicial crime limitation. Judicial crime creation raised
fairness concerns because defendants may be convicted of crimes they
unwittingly committed because no court or legislature had previously
defined their conduct as illegal. Here, however, the suggested judicial
interventions would not raise the same risk of unfair surprise. Were a
court to preclude enforcement of a specific law because the law creates
excessive discretion or because the court finds that enforcement had
an unjustified disparate impact, the judicial intervention would be
favorable to the defendant's interests. It is thus unpersuasive in this
context to cite legislative supremacy as an objection to judicial
involvement when the development of legislative supremacy as a
doctrine was premised, at least in part, on fair notice interests that




here require judicial involvement to protect. Even if a court were to
adopt the strategy of mandating greater enforcement of a specific law,
enforcement occurring as a result of the court's order would come only
after the order, which presumably would be a matter of public record.
Although a motorist still might be surprised at being stopped for
violating the law, the fact that the law previously was enacted in
legislation and enforcement was ordered by a court would raise less
serious fairness concerns than a conviction for a crime retroactively
created by a court. In any event, it would not involve any more
surprise than the current regime, in which police unpredictably
enforce minor traffic laws without a court-ordered mandate.
Finally, while it is true the rule of law has developed to
privilege legislative supremacy in defining criminal law and executive
prerogative over its enforcement, the rule of law also requires that
these institutions to adhere to constitutional protections of individual
rights. Courts should, and arguably must, intervene beyond their
traditional role if necessary to protect individual rights against
constitutional infringement. To the extent that specific laws, such as
traffic regulations, result in members of the public being subjected to
arbitrary and discriminatory government intrusions, courts
legitimately act to safeguard equal protection and due process
limitations on government power.
The judicial manageability objection is legitimate, but probably
overstated. Courts do lack the ability to monitor enforcement rates as
effectively as political institutions, and determining the public need to
enforce low-level traffic laws would seem to require an understanding
of safety-convenience trade-offs that courts are less equipped to make.
Historical experience suggests, however, that courts can engage
effectively in traditionally executive functions when doing so is
required to protect constitutional rights. For example, courts have
played an important role in desegregating public schools, 194
ameliorating prison conditions,195 and, most importantly for present
purposes, reforming police practices and other criminal procedures. 196
Moreover, through consent decrees reached through negotiations with
the regulated institutions, courts can help to ensure that the expertise
of the executive branch is consulted. Indeed, in the context of traffic
194. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 874-78 (1999) (discussing the constitutional bases for eliminating school segregation).
195. See id. at 878-82 (same, for judicially driven reform of prison conditions).
196. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1968) (defining the proper orbit of police "stop and
frisk" power under the Fourth Amendment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment requires that a suspect be informed of his rights to remain
silent and consult with an attorney); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-56 (1961) (incorporating
the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule against the states).
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stops, consent decrees imposing restrictions on racial profiling have
been reached under judicial supervision in a number of states. 197 This
is not to say that all of these reforms have been adequately effective or
satisfying. The question is whether they have been effective enough to
be worth pursuing in the absence of politically initiated changes, and
the answer would seem to be a cautionary yes.
An analogy to capital punishment may again be instructive.
Assessing whether a capital sentencing scheme leaves excessive
discretion to juries is by no means ministerial. It involves a judgment
about the probability that certain aggravating circumstances
adequately narrow the pool of death-eligible defendants to a degree
that imposition of the death penalty is sufficiently consistent. It is a
judgment about which judges often disagree. In Furman v. Georgia,
for example, a fractured majority of justices concluded that the capital
sentencing scheme gave insufficient guidance to juries, rendering
imposition of the death penalty excessively arbitrary and
unpredictable to satisfy due process concerns. 198 In McCleskey v.
Kemp, a divided majority came out the other way on a more modern
sentencing statute, concluding that while the existence of some
discretion created a risk of discriminatory verdicts, the risk was
insufficiently great to warrant invalidation of the statute. 199 Other
justices would have invalidated all death sentences under the
statute.200  Justice Stevens's assessment was in between.201 He
suggested that, rather than invalidating the scheme altogether, the
Court could limit the death penalty to the most heinous murders,
which, according to statistical evidence, resulted in a verdict of death
on a more consistent basis. 202 While measuring and assessing the
degree of discretion created by a law is thus difficult and often subject
197. See Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 92-
93 (2001) (noting racial profiling consent decrees between states/municipalities and the Justice
Department in California, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, among other ongoing
investigations/proceedings).
198. 408 U.S. 238, 240-371 (1972) (explaining the problem of arbitrary and discriminatory
sentencing in five concurring opinions, written by Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White,
and Marshall). But see id. at 396-403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, Rehnquist,
and Powell, JJ.) (arguing that capital punishment is not cruel and unusual, and that the Court's
majority has usurped the power rightfully delegated to legislatures and juries).
199. 481 U.S. 279, 311-12 (1987) (recognizing that discretion plays a fundamental role in the
criminal justice system, and finding that "the inherent lack of predictability of jury decisions
does not justify their condemnation").
200. See id. at 320-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J., and joined in part by
Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.) (arguing that the statute provided the opportunity for racially
discriminatory decisionmaking, which the evidence sufficiently demonstrated).
201. See id. at 366-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (favoring a limitation of the death penalty's
applicability and a remand to the trial court for consideration of the statistical evidence).
202. Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to disagreement, it does not follow that courts ought not to make such
determinations. Drawing a line between individual liberty interests in
due process and collective interests in crime control is often difficult,
but, as the Court explained in a different context, "[1]iberty must not
be extinguished for want of a line that is clear."20 3
Consider also that the void-for-vagueness doctrine involves
courts in making uncertain judgments about the degree of discretion
created by imprecise language. As Dean John Jeffries has observed,
assessing whether a law with imprecise language creates an
intolerable risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is not
mechanistic. 20 4 Rather, it involves a nuanced judgment that takes
account of the degree of ambiguity in the statutory language, as well
as an assessment of the nature of the conduct regulated, the context in
which enforcement takes place, the severity of the authorized penalty,
and the cost of invalidating a law on vagueness grounds if greater
precision in defining the crime is impracticable. 20 5
In the context of traffic enforcement, the forgoing examples
support the plausibility of courts making contextual assessments of
specific laws, taking account of the innocuous nature of the conduct
proscribed, the frequency of violation, the rate of under-enforcement,
and the danger, or lack thereof, of permitting the prohibited conduct
to escape enforcement. Common experience, expert witnesses, and
statistical data or surveys about, for example, the percentage of
motorists who speed compared to the number of motorists stopped for
speeding could be consulted. Although, as previously explained,
statistical evidence that proved racial profiling in a particular case
would be difficult to obtain, some evidence tending to show the
infrequency of enforcement of certain laws over time should be
obtainable and would be probative of whether a law is enforced in an
unduly selective manner. The question ultimately comes down to a
balance between virtually unfettered discretion if no judicial
intervention is taken and some assurance of predictability in law
enforcement albeit with some degree of uncertainty and imperfection
in the design of judicial remedies.
203. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (plurality opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
204. See Jeffries, supra note 26, at 196 ("The difficulty [with the vagueness doctrine] is that
there is no yardstick of impermissible indeterminacy.").
205. See id. at 196 (noting feasibility concerns); see also Amsterdam, Vagueness Doctrine,
supra note 27 at 95-96.
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CONCLUSION
Do specific rules reduce discretion and thereby reinforce the
rule of law? It depends. Most directly, specific rules have the effect of
making more clear, and therefore more consistent, the determination
whether certain conduct violates the law. Provided that specific
criminal laws leave some room for compliance, such laws do limit
affirmative enforcement discretion by precluding enforcement against
those whose conduct clearly complies with the specific rules. In
addition, if the conduct proscribed by a specific law is conduct that, if
observed by law enforcement officials, would exert pressure to enforce
the law, then specific rules limit negative enforcement discretion by
constraining the willingness of enforcement officials to ignore clear
violations of the law. If, however, specific laws criminalized all conduct
and imposed no obligation on officials to enforce against observed
violations, then specific laws would not reduce enforcement discretion
at all. Indeed, they would expand discretion to a limitless degree.
More realistically, as this Article demonstrates in the context of traffic
laws, specific rules directed at a broad range of conduct, commonly
engaged in by reasonable, law-abiding people, the violation of which
creates little stigma or expectation of enforcement, and which are, in
fact, dramatically underenforced, can create an extremely broad
degree of discretion, both as to whom to investigate and whom to
ignore. The predictable result is that enforcement officials will enforce
the law in an unpredictable, arbitrary, and discriminatory manner.
On most streets and highways in America, police authority to stop
motorists is essentially unfettered.
Moreover, the unfettered nature of enforcement discretion
created by traffic laws makes antidiscrimination review an unrealistic
check on enforcement motivated by race or other illegitimate factors.
Just as peremptory challenges in jury selection are very difficult to
monitor for discriminatory motives because all race-and-gender-
neutral explanations are legally permissible, so too are traffic stops
when a technical violation of law is all that is required to justify a stop
and when unsubstantiated pretextual suspicions may justify targeting
motorists whose traffic violations are less serious than those of other
motorists whom police admittedly ignore. Unlike peremptory
challenges, however, the circumstances surrounding the peremptory
traffic stop are not observable to a court, making the traffic stop more
difficult to review. To the extent that enforcement officials, who are
products of our society, believe that race and other constitutionally
suspect traits are predictive of criminal behavior, it is unrealistic to
assume that those officers will not act on those suspicions when there
is virtually no risk of accountability for doing so. In addition to
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discriminatory motives, unguided discretion also creates a significant
risk that enforcement will be arbitrary or ad hoc from one individual
officer to the next. Accordingly, the Court's assurance that equal
protection doctrine guards against discriminatory traffic enforcement
rings hollow.
The question arises whether the relationship between specific
rules, enforcement discretion, and antidiscrimination review
examined in this Article is generalizable beyond traffic enforcement
and beyond the criminal law. This Article has not considered other
contexts and therefore cannot speak to this question with confidence.
It is difficult to see, however, why a similar dynamic would not
operate in other contexts in which legislatures have increased the
scope of conduct and activities brought under regulation. Specifically
defined crimes against, for example, littering and jaywalking vest
police with broad discretion to investigate pedestrians in a selective
manner. Similarly, the overbroad scope of federal law, from mail fraud
and other white collar crime to the ubiquitous reach of the Patriot Act,
vests federal prosecutors with wide latitude over whom to prosecute
and for what misfeasance. Beyond criminal law, administrative
regulations addressed to such contexts as securities, taxes,
immigration, the environment, and health and safety conditions in the
workplace vest a broad degree of discretion in the agencies and
regulators charged with their enforcement. The more such regulations
address a broad range of actions that are often harmless or otherwise
not intuitively wrong, are difficult to avoid, and are significantly
underenforced, the more discretion such agencies will have to
investigate and sanction regulated persons and entities for arbitrary
or discriminatory reasons. While the confrontation between armed
police officers and citizens on the streets and highways raises
particularly acute concerns over broad delegations of discretion, these
other contexts also warrant attention and possible redress.
This Article also has suggested, in the context of traffic
enforcement, some strategies to reduce the degree of discretion
delegated through specific rules. In general, they would seek either to
increase the obligation to enforce the law or to decrease the scope of
conduct enforceable under law. Whatever mechanisms would most
effectively constrain discretion through specific rules, judicial
initiative under constitutional authority is probably required. The
political incentives for legislatures to delegate excessive discretion to
executive agencies, especially the police, are too great to entrust
restraint to the political process. Courts should at least intervene to
the extent that legislatures decline to do so.
By taking a broader perspective, we can understand judicial
intervention as a move within a larger historical dialectic between the
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courts and legislatures over the proper role of each in a system
premised on the rule of law. Recall that, in early common law, courts
created crimes in response to situations as they arose. By the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, judicial crime creation had
gone into disrepute. Rule-of-law values such as fair warning and
equality, as well as concerns over democratic legitimacy, led courts
and other jurists to shift the locus of crime creation from courts to
legislatures. Over time, legislatures, by enacting vague laws,
delegated lawmaking authority to police and courts, undermining the
collective and consistent guidance ostensibly provided by advance
legislative specification of crimes. In response, courts developed the
void-for-vagueness doctrine which, by requiring legislatures to define
crimes in specific terms, sought to return the locus of crime definition
to the legislature, in function as well as in form. In recent years,
legislatures again have circumvented their role in guiding the
enforcement of the criminal law, this time by over-criminalization
through specifically defined crimes. Exemplified by traffic laws, the
functional locus of criminal law largely has been delegated to traffic
cops, drug enforcement agents, and other law enforcement officers,
who can exploit traffic laws to investigate virtually any motorist for
any reason, recreating an excessive risk of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. If rule-of-law values, including the
principle that coercive action by government officials should be
consistent and predictable by reference to collective, legislative
instructions are to be preserved, then courts must respond to this
more modern form of legislative delegation. While the proposals in
this Article are new in one sense, they are old in another. They
represent a continuing and appropriate struggle between courts and
legislatures over the proper role of each in a tripartite constitutional
democracy.
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